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I. INTRODUCTION
Inclusionary housing programs typically require that a residential
home developer set aside a specified percentage of new units as very
low-, low- or moderate-income housing.' These programs usually pro-
1. The actual amounts which qualify, a household as very low-, low- or moderate-in-
come vary from region to region, but the definition tends to remain fairly constant. The
Department of Housing & Urban Development ("HUD") has defined these households in the
context of Section 8 housing as follows:
The term "low-income families" means those families whose incomes do not
exceed 80 per centum of the median income for the area, as determined by the
Secretary with adjustments for smaller and larger families, except that the Secretary
may establish income ceilings higher or lower than 80 per centum of the median
for the area on the basis of the Secretary's findings that such variations are neces-
sary because of prevailing levels of construction costs or unusually high or low
family incomes. The term "very low-income families" means low-income families
whose incomes do not exceed 50 per centum of the median family income for the
area, as determined by the Secretary.
42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) (Supp. V 1993). Elsewhere, HUD has defined moderate-income fami-
lies as "families or persons whose incomes are between 80 percent and 95 percent of the
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vide incentives to offset the costs of providing affordable housing.
Cities and counties throughout the country have adopted inclusionary
housing programs,2 and California, one of the affordable housing
leaders, is considering adoption of a mandatory statewide program.
The most important aspect of inclusionary housing is that it
forces the production of low- and moderate-income housing at a time
when there is a critical shortage of this housing. However,
inclusionary housing is not problem-free. First, it puts the onus of
solving a society-wide problem on a small group, namely developers.
This may be unfair considering the scope and severity of the prob-
lem, and that the group primarily responsible for solving the problem
is not primarily responsible for causing the problem.3 Second, it may
lead to a decrease in the production of housing generally, as well as
the production of housing affordable to low- and moderate-income
households.4 Third, it poses a number of legal issues the resolution
of which may undermine inclusionary housing programs. For example,
inclusionary housing may be invalid as a taking or may violate the
due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Consti-
tution and individual state constitutions. Similarly, resale restrictions,
which are included in many inclusionary housing programs, may be
invalid restraints on alienation and violate antitrust laws.
The issues raised by inclusionary housing require a fresh review
in light of changes to the United States Supreme Court and current
trends favoring private property rights.' The inclusionary housing
issue is also timely because California is considering adoption of a
mandatory statewide inclusionary housing program,6 which, if adopt-
ed, would be the first statewide program in the country. It would
have such far-reaching consequences that prior to adoption of such a
program, it is important to analyze issues posed by inclusionary hous-
ing, fully exploring its advantages and disadvantages.
Part II of this Article provides a background on the affordable
median income for the area, as determined by the Secretary with adjustments for smaller and
larger families." 12 U.S.C. § 4119(5) (Supp. V 1993). Some states also rely on these HUD
definitions. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50105 (West 1994).
2. While some localities enact inclusionary housing programs through inclusionary hous-
ing ordinances or inclusionary zoning, others do so by incorporating them into their housing
elements or other state-mandated housing requirements. Thus, for ease of reference, I will
refer to all such inclusionary housing measures as "inclusionary housing programs."
3. See infra text accompanying note 164.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 218-20.
5. See infra text in first full paragraph following note 330.
6. See infra part II.D.
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housing crisis, responses to the crisis, and why inclusionary housing
is a crucial part of the response. It then gives a more detailed de-
scription of inclusionary housing, including representative components
of inclusionary housing programs. This part concludes with an intro-
duction of California's proposed inclusionary housing program. Part
I of this Article surveys policies in support of inclusionary housing.
Part IV analyzes criticisms of inclusionary housing and in the process,
reveals many flaws in those criticisms. Part V discusses legal chal-
lenges to 'inclusionary housing programs, including challenges on the
grounds that inclusionary housing constitutes a taking, violates sub-
stantive due process and equal protection, imposes invalid restraints
on alienation, and violates antitrust law. The Article concludes with
my thesis that most inclusionary housing programs, including
California's proposed program, remain viable and are legally valid,
provided the governing regulations are carefully drafted to maximize
efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness.
II. BACKGROUND
This section first provides a brief historical context to the afford-
able housing crisis and responses to the crisis at federal, state and
local levels. It then addresses why those responses have generally
been inadequate, and why they should be supplemented by
inclusionary housing. It concludes with a description of inclusionary
housing programs and an overview of California's proposed program.
A. The Affordable Housing Crisis
Most people would agree that everyone in this country has a
right to shelter meeting minimum quality standards. Federal policy
promotes the "[r]ealization as soon as feasible ... of a decent home
and a suitable living environment for every American family."7 It has
even been suggested that there is a constitutional right to housing.'
The Supreme Court, however, has not yet recognized such a right.' It
7. Originally declared in Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, § 2, 63 Stat. 413, reaffirmed
in Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 1601, 82 Stat. 601
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988)).
8. See Frank 1. Miechelman, The Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 207 (1970) (arguing that the right to housing is a fundamental
constitutional right and positing that legislative classifications relating to low- income housing
were suspect, thus subjecting them to the heightened strict scrutiny standard reserved for
suspect classifications).
9. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143
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has stated that "[w]e are unable to perceive . . any constitutional
guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality. . . . Absent
constitutional mandate, the assurance[s] of adequate housing ... are
legislative, not judicial, functions."'" Most state courts have also re-
fused to recognize housing as a fundamental right."' However, at
least one state court has determined that municipalities within its
jurisdiction are obligated to provide developers an opportunity to
build affordable housing. 2 Admittedly, Mount Laurel II and Mount
Laurel I do not guarantee that affordable housing will be built. They
do, however, remove a hurdle by providing that municipalities in
growth areas have a constitutional obligation to provide a realistic
opportunity for development of housing for low- and moderate-income
families in their regions through land use regulations. 3
In spite of judicial refusal to recognize a right to decent quality
housing meeting threshold affordability standards-and perhaps be-
cause of such refusal-there is an affordable housing crisis in this
country." While it has long been recognized that low-income fami-
(1971) (upholding statute which provides that no low-rent housing can be developed by a
state public body until such project is approved by a majority vote).
10. Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74.
11. Adams v. Superior CL, 524 P.2d 375, 379 (Cal. 1974) (holding that adequate hous-
ing is not so fundamental a right as to invoke the strict scrutiny standard under the equal
protection clause of the Constitution); McQueen v. National Capital Housing Auth., 366 A.2d
786, 797 (D.C. 1976); Collins v. AAA Homebuilders, Inc., 333 S.E.2d 792, 794 (W. Va.
1985). But, some state legislatures have countered by providing statutory authority for the
provision of housing to all of their residents. For example. "Itihe availability of housing is of
vital statewide importance, and the early attainment of decent housing and a suitable living
environment for every California family is a priority of the highest order." CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 65580(a) (West 1994); see also NJ. STAT. ANN. § 55:13C-1(c) (West 1994) ("It is a mat-
ter of urgent public concern that safe and habitable shelter be available at all times to all
residents of this State.").
12. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390,
415 (NJ. 1983) [hereinafter Mount Laurel II] (imposing an affirmative obligation on many
municipalities to use government subsidies together with other zoning techniques to provide
incentives which would assure the development of affordable housing); Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (NJ. 1975) [hereinafter
Mount Laurel 1].
13. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 415; Mount Laurel 1, 336 A.2d at 724.
14. See generally CAL. GOv'T CODE § 65913 (West 1994) ("[T]here exists a severe
shortage of affordable housing, especially for persons and families of low and moderate in-
come."); ALAN MALLACH, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND PRACTICES 4
(1984) ("Studies and publications on the subject of housing appeared in which the word
'crisis' became more and more prominent."); Paul K. Stockman, Note, Anti-Snob Zoning in
Massachusetts: Assessing One Attempt at Opening the Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA.
L. Rnv. 535 (1992). The California legislature's findings in its proposed inclusionary housing
program state that "[m]any lower income renters in California are paying 50 percent or more
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lies have not been able to purchase housing, in recent decades, many
middle-income families have also been unable to do so.
15
A recent publication reports that in California, "[o]nly 16% of
the state's low- income housing goals have been produced during the
most recent housing element cycles through December 31, 1989. ''16
Even more startling was the report's finding that "[a]lmost one quar-
ter (24%) of all California communities are producing no low income
housing."'7 Other states are experiencing similar housing shortages
for low-income families.' 8
There are many reasons for the affordable housing crisis. Hous-
ing costs have escalated. From 1970 to 1980, the cost of a new home
nearly tripled and the cost of an existing home more than doubled. 9
The rise in home costs results from several factors: first, the scarcity
and resultant high cost of raw land and materials; second, the high
demand for housing; and third, the increased regulation of the build-
ing industry.2" For example, existing permit processes, slow-growth
policies and land use regulations, including low density, open space
and environmental requirements, high site preparation costs, subdivi-
sion fees, infrastructure costs, and other general and specific fees
imposed by local governments, add significant costs to the production
of new housing.2' Many of these regulations are enacted as a result
of their family income for housing. Twenty percent of renters live in overcrowded or unsafe
housing. For at least 250,000 Californians each year, home will be in cars, open fields, city
parks, and the streets." A.B. 1684, 55th Sess. § 1 (Cal. Reg. Sess. 1993) (at proposed
§ 65853.5(a)(2)) [hereinafter Proposed MIHO] (which proposal would amend the California
Government Code). Contra Peter D. Salins, Toward a Permanent Housing Problem, 85 PUB.
INTEREST 22 (1986).
15. MALLACH, supra note 14, at 9 ("In essence, the household that in 1965 had a
choice of housing from among the substantial majority of new units on the market, was
limited to a relatively small number by 1978, and was more or less completely locked out of
the market by 1981.").
16. CALIFoRNIA COALITON FOR RURAL HOUSING, LOCAL PROGRESS IN MEETING THE
Low INCOME HOUSING CHALLENGE 1 (1990).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 1106 (McKinney 1991) ("[T]here is a
serious shortage of decent affordable housing in the state for persons of low income.").
19. R. ALLEN HAYS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND URBAN HOUSING 58-77 (1985).
20. Id. at 63; see also MALLACH, supra note 14, at 9; Gregory M. Fox & Barbara
Rosenfeld Davis, Density Bonus Zoning to Provide Low and Moderate Cost Housing, 3
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1015, 1017-19 (1976); Stockman, supra note 14, at 536.
21. See generally ADVISORY COMMISSION ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE
HOUSING, "NOT IN MY BACK YARD" REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING (1991)
[hereinafter NIMBY REPORT]. There is no question that regulation significantly increases the
cost of new housing. "Although costs vary widely, the Commission has seen evidence that
increases of 20 to 35 percent in housing prices attributable to excessive regulation are not
[Vol. 23:539
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of pressure by slow-growth advocates and others concerned with
maintaining property values. This public sentiment translates into
defeat of affordable housing measures arising from the "Not In My
Back Yard" ("NIMBY") syndrome.
In addition, many states have legislation which deters the con-
struction of affordable housing. For example, the California State
Constitution requires voters to approve new construction of low-in-
come housing which is at least fifty percent publicly financed.'
While many residents believe that more affordable housing should be
developed, they do not want it in their neighborhoods. In California,
residents can and do prevent construction of low-income housing by
voting down proposed affordable housing projects pursuant to the
referendum authority. As another example, a Florida statute dealing
with affordable housing incentives, by its nature, makes it difficult to
approve such incentives. It provides that "[tihe approval by the advi-
sory committee of its affordable housing incentive recommendations
must be made by affirmative vote of a majority of the membership of
the advisory committee taken at a public hearing."'  The statute also
sets forth rigorous public hearing requirements.24
uncommon in the most severely affected areas of the country." Id. at 1-1. The NIMBY Re-
port also discusses the effect of slow-growth measures on affordable housing, particularly in
California, noting that "by the end of 1988, 907 local growth-control or management mea-
sures had been enacted in the State to slow development." Id. at 2-2 (citation omitted).
22. CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV, § 1. This article provides in part:
No low-rent housing project shall hereafter be developed, constructed, or acquired
in any manner by any state public body until, a majority of the qualified electors
of the city, town or county, as the case may be, in which it is proposed to devel-
op, construct, or acquire the same, voting upon such issue, approve such project by
voting in favor thereof at an election to be held for that purpose, or at any gener-
al or special election.
Id. This ordinance was challenged as "unconstitutional discrimination because it hampers
persons desiring public housing from achieving their objective when no such roadblock faces
other groups seeking to influence other public decisions to their advantage." James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971). The challenge was unsuccessful partly because the
ordinance was found to be neutral on its face and not aimed at racial minorities, only at
low-rent housing projects. Id. at 141-42. On November 2, 1993, California residents had the
opportunity to significantly weaken this constitutional article. They declined by voting in
convincing numbers not to approve Proposition 168 (40% of voters voted for the change and
60% opposed it). See March Fong Eu, California Secretary of State, Statement of Vote, Nov.
2, 1993. The proposed amendment would have removed the requirement that all affordable
housing projects be put to a vote, instead requiring voter approval only on projects in which
a minimum of ten percent of the voters in the community where the project is located have
signed a petition to put project approval on the ballot.
23. FL. STAT. ANN. § 420.9076(5) (West 1993).
24. Id.
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Starting in the late 1970s and continuing through the early
1990s, the Consumer Price Index ("CPI") for housing costs rose at a
much faster pace than income.' This rapid increase in housing costs
disproportionately impacts very low-, low-, and moderate-income
households. 26 Aggravating this is a decreased supply of affordable
housing for low- and moderate-income households because of factors
such as condominium conversion, loss of government-assisted units,
abandonment of run-down housing, urban redevelopment, and rental
property's tarnished investment desirability as a result of the 1986
Tax Reform Act.2
B. Responses to the Crisis
Having set forth the existence and extent of the affordable hous-
ing crisis, it is now appropriate to look at various responses to the
crisis in order to establish that even if they are somewhat effective,
by themselves, they are inadequate. While it is beyond the scope of
this Article to detail the history of federal responses to the affordable
housing problem, it is important to briefly discuss federal policy
relating to affordable housing.28
Federal housing policy expanded in the 1930s in response to the
Great Depression. Since then, Congress has approved various acts
involving public housing.29 For example, the Housing Act of 1937
25. HAYS, supra note 19, at 59; MALLACH, supra note 14, at 9.
26. "It is not unusual for moderate- and lower-income families to pay 35% percent or
more of income for shelter, and if very low-income families are to live in standard housing
without benefit of subsidy, they may pay up to 50% of income on shelter." CHARLES E.
DAYE ET AL., HOUSING AND CoMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 112 (2d ed. 1989); Stockman, supra
note 14, at 536 ("Nearly half of the poorest quartile of renters devoted over half of their
income to rent; almost 27% paid more than three-quarters of their income for housing."). The
NIMBY Report noted that "[t]he rise in housing costs has hurt lower income renter families,
particularly in the West." NIMBY REPORT, supra note 21, at 1-5. Compare with HAYS, supra
note 19, at 60, 62 (while Hays thought that low-income renters were disproportionately im-
pacted by increased housing costs, he noted that with respect to low-income buyers, "the per-
centage of income paid for housing by homeowners as a group stayed relatively constant.");
Richard F. Muth, Redistribution of Income Through Regulation in Housing, 32 EMORY L.J.
691, 693 (1983) ("Proper interpretation of the evidence strongly suggests that the fraction of
income spent on housing is roughly constant throughout the income range.").
27. HAYS, supra note 19, at 58; see also Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 163, 469 (1988)).
28. For a general discussion of twentieth century federal housing policy, see DAYE El'
AL., supra note 26; HAYS, supra note 19, at 58-77; Lawrence M. Friedman, Public Housing
and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CAL. L. REV. 642 (1966) [hereinafter Friedman, Public Hous-
ing].
29. See, e.g., National Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified in
(Vol. 23:539
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established a public housing program.3" The government generally
finances public housing, but it is actually administered by local hous-
ing officials."' While various agencies have built a substantial num-
ber of units under public housing programs,32 such programs have
generally been considered unsuccessful as a general solution to the
affordable housing crisis for a number of reasons.33 First, public
housing programs suffer from the stigma associated with "govern-
ment-provided housing."' Second, the programs cluster low-income
residents together, frequently resulting in racial as well as economic
homogeneity." Third, public housing is usually located in inner cit-
ies, typically offering inferior educational and employment opportu-
nities. Lastly, such housing is frequently a crime magnet where many
residents do not feel safe.36 These programs do, however, provide
housing that might not otherwise be available for low- and very low-
income households. 7
The government has also provided, and continues to provide,
direct and indirect subsidies to developers, landlords and very low-,
low-, and moderate-income households. 8 In addition, the federal
12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-15 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413
(1949) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5301-20 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
30. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-37w (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
31. HAYS, supra note 19, at 90; Fox & Davis, supra note 20, at 1018. See generally
Friedman, Public Housing, supra note 28.
32. A 1995 publication stated that "[alpproximately 1.3 million households live in public
housing developments." DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HUD
REINVENTION: FROM BLUEPRINT TO ACTION 33 (1995).
33. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING (1968);
EUGENE J. MEEHAN, PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY: CONVENTION VERSUS REALITY 169-70 (1975).
34. HAYS, supra note 19, at 90-91.
35. See, e.g., SEGREGATION IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS 122 (A. Hawley & V. Rock eds.,
1973) [hereinafter SEGREGATION] ('Partly because the initial purpose [of public housing] was
interlocked with slum clearance and partly because the projects tended to be built in areas
already inhabited by the poor, the projects came to be associated with run-down areas, with
the poor, and increasingly, with black or other minority occupants."); Bruce L. Ackerman,
Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 245, 292 n.226 (1974) ("For example, as of February 1969, virtually all Chicago
public housing projects were located in black areas, and approximately 11,700 black persons
were on the waiting list for these housing projects.").
36. HAYS, supra note 19, at 91; MEEHAN, supra note 33, at 169.
37. HAYS, supra note 19, at 91-92, 258.
38. There are far too many programs to describe in this Article, but some sample subsi-
dy programs include the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (As originally enacted, the National Housing Act Section 8 program
19951
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government administers a number of financing programs." Finally, it
provides affordable housing through rehabilitation of existing hous-
ing.40
While the federal government has responded to the affordable
housing crisis through the development and administration of many
programs such as those discussed above, the crisis has not been re-
solved through such programs, only somewhat ameliorated.
At a state level, the response to the affordable housing crisis is
varied. The state responses would provide material for an entire text.
I will thus focus on California because it is a leader in the affordable
housing arena and is currently very active in the area of inclusionary
housing.
The California legislature has enacted various laws and statutes
affecting affordable housing. For example, it has declared that "[t]he
provision of housing affordable to low- and moderate-income house-
holds requires the cooperation of all levels of government.,,4' To
assure that cooperation, each local government must prepare a general
plan which contains, among other things, a housing element sec-
tion.42 A housing element consists of three general components:
(a) An assessment of housing needs and an inventory of resources
and constraints relevant to the meeting of these needs....
(b) A statement of ... goals, quantified objectives, and policies
consisted of discrete programs focusing on new construction, substantial rehabilitation, moder-
ate rehabilitation, and existing housing. The first two programs were repealed in 1983, and
the third program was substantially cut back at the same time. The focus then shifted to
existing housing with particular emphasis on a voucher program.); National Housing Act, ch.
847, § 235, 48 Stat. 1246, repealed by Housing and Community Development Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 401(d), 101 Stat. 1815, 1899 (1988) (terminating a homeowner subsi-
dy program created by Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 101(a), 82 Stat. 476, 477 (1968)).
39. Again, there are too many programs to include an exhaustive list. Some sample pro-
grams include the National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246; Housing Act of 1954, ch.
649, 68 Stat. 590 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 18, 20, 31, 38, 40, 42 and 48 U.S.C.
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
448, 82 Stat. 476 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, 18, 20, 31, 38, 40, 42, and 49
U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 101(a), 75
Stat. 149, 150 (1961) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1715 (1988)).
40. Rehabilitation of housing is a lengthy topic beyond the purview of this Article.
Some representative programs include the Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-560, § 312,
78 Stat. 769, 790 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1452b (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633, 662 (1974)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f, 5301-20 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Public and private forces
are both involved in the rehabilitation of existing housing.
41. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 65580(c) (West 1994).
42. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65302(c) (West 1994).
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relative to the maintenance, preservation, improvement, and develop-
ment of housing ...
(c) A program which sets forth a five-year schedule of actions the
local government is undertaking or intends to undertake to imple-
ment the policies and achieve the goals and objectives of the hous-
ing element ... In order to make adequate provision for the hous-
ing needs of all economic segments of the community, the program
shall do all of the following ... (2) Assist in the development of
adequate housing to meet the needs of low- and moderate-income
households. . .."
Many California cities and counties have complied in part with
the housing element requirements by providing both an assessment of
housing needs for all income segments of the population, and policies
to maintain, improve, and develop affordable housing. Several, how-
ever, have failed to address or identify how they plan to implement
those policies.' This is problematic because there are no penalties or
means of enforcing compliance with proposals set forth in a housing
element. Thus, there is no mechanism to ensure that a city or county
is actually providing its fair share of affordable housing. At most, an
interested party can bring an action against a city or county to ensure
that the housing element is in conformity with the provisions of the
applicable government code sections.45
There is presently no state law mandating the provision of af-
fordable housing.46 However, if developers propose projects for hous-
ing affordable to low- and moderate-income households, local govern-
ments must approve those projects without imposing additional condi-
tions that would render the projects infeasible. 7 Thus, the local gov-
43. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65583(a)-(c) (West 1994) (emphasis added). Note, however,
that the housing element does not require the production of affordable housing. It simply
requires a plan explaining how affordable housing could be produced. Note further that it
does not specify how a government program should assist in the development of affordable
housing.
44. A majority of California cities do not comply with state housing element require-
ments. "Only about a quarter of California communities now have housing plans that meet
the state regulations." Michael McCabe, Outcry in Tony Towns Over Low-Income Homes, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 23, 1993, at 17.
45. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65587(b) (West 1994). However, there is a rebuttable presump-
tion that a housing element or amendment thereto is valid if such element or amendment is
determined to comply with the requirements of article 10.6 of the Government Code. CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 65589.3 (West 1994).
46. Each city or county must set forth a plan for providing and maintaining housing for
all income groups, but it need not execute that plan. See supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
47. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65589.5(b) (West 1994) (provided that the proposed project
19951
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emment can disapprove such proposed projects only on specific,
limited grounds.48
In addition to the above laws, there are various state measures
designed to alleviate the affordable housing crisis. These include laws
providing density bonuses and other incentives to developers who
construct units for low- and moderate-income households.49 Density
bonuses allow a developer to exceed density limits in exchange for
the provision of housing affordable to qualified residents." This is
justified because any lost profits resulting from the provision of hous-
ing at below market rates will be offset by income from extra units
allowed by the density bonus.
Finally, State Assembly Bill 1684, which would establish the
mixed-income housing opportunities ("MIHO") policy, was recently
introduced.5 If enacted, the Proposed MIHO would require all local
governments to have an inclusionary housing program in place by a
given date. Otherwise, a state model ordinance would become effec-
tive in any localities without such a program.52 Thus, any new de-
velopment would require a developer to provide affordable housing or
the means to produce affordable housing. For example, if it was not
feasible to produce affordable housing, a developer could instead
provide fees or raw land to be used for affordable housing. I will
discuss the Proposed MIHO in more detail in part D of this section,
below.
As of January 1992, in California alone, at least fifty two coun-
ties and cities had inclusionary housing programs.53 Just prior to
that, at least twelve other jurisdictions were considering implementing
new programs or strengthening existing programs.' 4 Cities and coun-
ties in states such as Massachusetts and Maryland also have adopted
complies with certain stated conditions).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65915 (West 1994). Normally, a locality will be
required to offer some incentives, including density bonuses, to developers who set aside a
minimum percentage of units in a proposed development for low- and very low-income
households. Id. The percentage varies depending on the composition of the targeted residents.
Id.
50. Id.
51. Proposed MIHO, supra note 14.
52. lt § 65853.7(b)-(c). The statute would allow either an existing program subject to
approval, a new program subject to approval, or the state's model ordinance.
53. Id. § 65853.5(b)(3).
54. SAN DIEGO HOUSING COMM'N, CALIFORNIA INCLUSIONARY HOUSno SURVEY (1992)
[hereinafter CA 11 SuRVE 1 .
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inclusionary housing programs."5 Thus, from the federal government
to local governments across the country, there is a wide-spread recog-
nition of the affordable housing crisis, the need to resolve the crisis,
and the advantages of solving it through inclusionary housing.
C. A Specific Response to the Crisis: Inclusionary Housing
Inclusionary housing programs have become a more common
solution to the affordable housing crisis. State legislation typically
authorizes local governments to enact zoning laws affecting hous-
ing. 6 Inclusionary housing programs are generally enacted pursuant
to a locality's zoning powers and are typically effectuated through
inclusionary zoning ordinances, policy statements, or a locality's hous-
ing element.
Inclusionary housing programs have been in effect since the early
1970s17 and are still being formulated. 8 Every program has its own
55. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (West 1993) (The Massachu-
setts Low and Moderate Income Housing Act; while this is not a true inclusionary housing
program as it does not condition development approval on the provision of low- and moder-
ate-income housing, it reduces exclusionary practices.); MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE
ch. 25A-1 (1988) (Maryland's Moderately Priced Dwelling Unit Ordinance).
56. Most states have enabling acts, many of which are modeled on a standard act. See
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING Acr (1926). Note, however,
that a Fairfax County, Virginia inclusionary housing program was found invalid because it
was not authorized under Virginia's state enabling act. Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff En-
ter., Inc., 198 S.E.2d 600, 602 (Va. 1973). The DeGroff court went further by stating that
even if proper enabling legislation were in effect, the housing program would have been a
taking without just compensation and therefore invalid. Id. at 602. Many commentators have
criticized the DeGroff decision. For a general discussion of courts' reluctance to follow
DeGroff, see MALLACH, supra note 14, at 29-30. Authorization to enact zoning laws also
arises through the police power which justifies government action if it promotes and preserves
health, safety, and welfare. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 383 (1926);
Miller v. Board of Public Works, 234 P. 381, 383 (Cal. 1925).
57. See the Below Market Rate ("BMR") Program in Palo Alto, which was (and contin-
ues to be) administered by the Palo Alto Housing Corporation, an independent non-profit
corporation, pursuant to a contract between the corporation and the city of Palo Alto. Palo
Alto, Cal., Resolution 4725 (Apr. 2, 1973) (as originally enacted).
58. San Diego is currently considering adopting a program which it direly needs. "A
city staff report concludes that there are 75,000 people in need of low-income housing in San
Diego and 34,000 who pay more than 50 percent of their income for rent." Thor Biberman,
Council Oks Program to Help Poor Obtain Housing, SAN DIEGO DAILY TRANScRIPT, Jan.
27, 1993, at Bl. San Diego's proposed program as drafted is based on recommendations
made by the San Diego Inclusionary Housing Task Force in July 1992. The San Diego City
Council approved the proposal in concept on January 26, 1993, which proposal was also
lukewarmly approved by the local building association. However, when it came up for vote
on November 9, 1993, it was instead tabled until 1994, when three new council members
took office. It was tabled in part because the building association wanted time to author a
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defined terms and parameters. Some programs in California are volun-
tary, but an overwhelming majority are mandatory.59 Voluntary pro-
grams typically provide that a developer may set aside a suggested
percentage of inclusionary units' in exchange for various incen-
tives.6' Mandatory programs require that a developer set aside a cer-
tain percentage of inclusionary units as a condition to approval of the
developer's project.6' The percentage of inclusionary units is depen-
dent on various factors, including whether the unit is a rental unit or
for-sale, and whether it is intended for very low-, low-, or moderate-
income households. The requisite set-aside percentage varies from as
few as six percent,63 to as many as thirty-five percent,' but fifteen
percent is about average.' Some inclusionary housing programs ap-
ply to all new developments within a locality, including development
of a single home.66 Many programs, however, apply only to projects
containing a minimum number of units, ranging from two67 to fif-
ty.
68
new proposal. It objected to the mandatory nature of the ordinance which would have re-
quired that five percent of the units in rental projects and ten percent of the units in for-sale
projects be affordable to low- and moderate-income households. The building association
prefers a voluntary approach to inclusionary housing. See Lori Weisberg, Affordable Housing
Plan Postponed, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 10, 1993, at B3. Most parties indicate that
they want a consensus and are willing to take more time to find an approach that is palat-
able to both developers and housing advocates. Id.
59. At the time that the San Diego Inclusionary Housing Task Force prepared its Cali-
fornia Inclusionary Housing Survey, of the fifty two cities and counties included in the sur-
vey which had some type of inclusionary housing program, only three counties and two cities
had voluntary programs. CA IH SURVEY, supra note 54, at 1-4.
60. While different programs label units for very low-, low-, and moderate-income fami-
lies differently, ranging from "below market rate unit," to "affordable unit," to "inclusionary
unit," for ease of reference, I will label these "inclusionary units."
61. See, e.g., Orange County, Cal., Resolution 83-184 (Feb. 1, 1983) (Note, however,
that Orange County initially adopted a mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinance in 1979,
which was amended in 1983 to phase out the mandatory program in favor of a voluntary
program.).
62. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., MuN. CODE, ch. 15B.5 (1987); Davis, Cal., Ordinance
1567 (June 20, 1990).
63. See, e.g., VISTA, CAL., ORDINANCES ch. 18.34, § 18.34.120 (1993).
64. The city of Davis requires that twenty-five percent of new rental housing in devel-
opments of twenty or more units be affordable to low-income and very low-income house-
holds. Davis, Cal., Draft Housing Element Update 116 (Dec. 15, 1993).
65. See, e.g., Agoura Hills, Cal., Ordinance 137 (Sept. 23, 1987); Monterey, Cal., Ordi-
nance 2416 (July 8, 1981), amended by Resolution 82-10 (Jan. 19, 1982) and by Ordinance
3121A (Mar. 16, 1993); SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE ORDINANCE 93-09, ch. 24.16,
§ 24.16.010 (1993).
66. See, e.g., CARLSBAD, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 21.85, § 21.85.050 (1993).
67. See, e.g., CORONADO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 82.21.020 (1993).
68. See, e.g., City of Chula Vista, Housing Element of 1991 111-15 (Feb. 26. 1992)
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Common incentives under both mandatory and voluntary pro-
grams include density bonuses, subsidies, development fee credits,
streamlined permit processing, and waiver or leniency in enforcement
of development standards.69 In addition, local governments may offer
tax exempt bond financing, or may work with developers to obtain
tax exempt bond financing, tax credits, or abatement from other enti-
ties such as federal and state agencies. 0
Most programs allow a developer to satisfy the housing produc-
tion requirements in a number of ways. The first choice is always on-
site production of inclusionary units, but developers may sometimes
provide inclusionary units off-site." Another option for developers is
to pay a fee to either the regulating government, a housing trust fund,
or a stated agency, in-lieu of building the requisite number of
inclusionary units. The funds are typically earmarked for the produc-
tion of inclusionary units.72 Developers may also buy credits from
other developers who have exceeded the minimum inclusionary re-
quirements.73 Finally, they may donate land within an appropriate
zone, such land to be used for the production of affordable housing
by another agency or developer (i.e., an agency which receives fees
in-lieu of units).74
Many inclusionary housing programs require that inclusionary
units be dispersed throughout a development rather than clustered, and
that the exterior design be consistent with the design of non-
inclusionary units.75 However, many codes do allow a developer to
(adopted by the City Council under Resolution No. 16532).
69. See, e.g., Monterey, Cal., Ordinance 2416 (July 8, 1981) (includes non-general fund
subsidies, mortgage revenue bonds, waivers, or density increases).
70. Id.
71. At least 32 programs in California allow off-site production of a portion of the
inclusionary units. CA IH SuRvEy, supra note 54, at 5.
72. Most inclusionary housing programs in California allow in-lieu fees, especially if a
fraction of an affordable unit would otherwise be required or it is simply not financially
feasible to build inclusionary units in the area of development (i.e., because the project is too
small or is in an area of exceptionally high land values). Id. However, some of these pro-
grams have collected a substantial amount of fees and have yet to produce a single housing
unit. See infra notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Orange County, Cal., Resolution 89-961, Attachment "A," H-D-4 to 5
(June 21, 1989); SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE ORDINANCE 91-45, ch. 24.16, § 24.16.030
(1985).
74. See, e.g., Monterey, Cal., Resolution 82-16 (Jan. 19, 1982).
75. For example, one code provides:
Inclusionary units should be reasonably dispersed throughout the development,
should contain on the average the same number of bedrooms as the market rate
units in the development, and should be compatible with the design and use of
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alter the level and quantity of interior design features in order to
make the production of such units more cost efficient. 6
Other common requirements of inclusionary housing programs
are that the units be built concurrently with, or prior to, market rate
units, and that each development phase of a project include a propor-
tional number of inclusionary units.'
Qualification requirements for initial occupants of inclusionary
units vary from program to program, but are always tied to income
(which is generally modified based on family size according to HUD
guidelines), and are usually adjusted for inflation on an annual ba-
sis.7 The easiest, and perhaps most common way to choose occu-
pants from qualifying renters or buyers is to simply hold a lottery.79
Programs also look to other factors in prioritizing applicants, such as
family size, whether applicants are employees of, or work within, the
locality supervising the program, and how long the applicants have
resided in the regulating locality.8" Even with high priority appli-
cants, demand often exceeds supply, so a lottery is still necessary.8
In order to keep inclusionary units affordable, most programs
have resale or rental restrictions. 2 Surprisingly, a number of pro-
grams in California have no mechanisms in place for preserving
affordability.
8 3
Resale or rental restrictions are most commonly established
through covenants, deed restrictions, wrap around financing, land sales
remaining units in terms of appearance, materials, and finished quality. The appli-
cant shall have the option of reducing the interior amenity level and square footage
of inclusionary units, provided all units conform to the requirements of the City
Building and Housing Codes.
SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE ORDINANCE 91-45, § 1 (1993) (amending § 24.16.010(2) of
ch. 24.16 of Title 24 of the Municipal Code).
76. Id.
77. Id.; see also Proposed MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.7(a)(8); Carlsbad, Cal., Ordi-
nance NS-232, at 21.85.120 (Apr. 20, 1993).
78. See, e.g., Irvine, Cal., Resolution 93-68 (May 25, 1993) ("[M]onthly rents shall be
determined by . . . current HUD rent level for Orange County based on unit size, household
size and income levels.").
79. See, e.g., Monterey, Cal., Resolution 90-12 (Jan. 16, 1990).
80. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE Ch. 15B (1987); Irvine, Cal., Resolution 89-
161 (Nov. 28, 1989); City of Palo Alto, Amended Below Market Rate (BMR) Rental Guide-
lines, section 11(2) (June 26, 1988).
81. See Monterey, Cal., Resolution 90-12 (Jan. 16, 1990).
82. See, e.g., BERKELEY, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 15B (1987); Irvine, Cal., Resolution 89-
161 (Nov. 28, 1989); City of Palo Alto, Amended Below Market Rate (BMR) Rental Guide-
lines, section 1(2) (June 26, 1988).
83. CA IH SURVEY, supra note 54, at 1-4.
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contracts, options, and first rights of refusal.' 4 Some of these restric-
tions have been described as follows:
1. Deed Restrictions: A developer may record a restriction against
a property in the deed. This binds the buyer and all later buyers to
sell only to low to moderate income families.
2. Wrap-around Financing: A developer records a subordinate
mortgage against a property. This does not come due unless the
home is sold. When sold, a portion of the equity is returned to the
moderate income housing program to subsidize some other home.
This work[s] as a deterrent to speculation by the buyer and has
other administrative advantages.
3. Land Sale Contracts: The developer sells a home to a buyer
under contract of sale. The home only transfers title when the buyer
has lived in the home for a specific period, say, five or ten years.
This deters speculation by buyers.
4. First Right of Refusal: The developer records "first right of
refusal" in favor of the City for a property, at a pre-stipulated price.
When the home comes up for sale, the City has the option of im-
mediately buying the home or of letting the owner sell it on the
open market. If the City buys the home it then sells the home at
that price to another low to moderate income buyer.s
Most resale restrictions set a minimum term of affordability, ranging
from five years 6 to infinite duration.87
The nature of a resale restriction is two-fold. First, the amount of
equity appreciation is limited in order to preserve the affordable na-
ture of the unit for future purchasers. Price restrictions vary and re-
sale pricing formulas can be very complex. Simplified, a sales price
is typically limited to the sum of: the seller's purchase price; annual
appreciation tied to a readily identifiable measure such as the con-
sumer price index ("CPI"), inflation or median local appreciation; the
84. See, e.g., Monterey, Cal., Resolution 82-16 (Jan. 19, 1982), amended by Ordinance
3121A (Mar. 16, 1993).
85. City of Monterey, Developer's Guide to the Moderate Income Housing Ordinance
No. 2416 as Amended I F (1993) [hereinafter Monterey, Developer's Guide].
86. See, e.g., Sacramento, Cal., City Council Resolution 91-731 (Sept. 17, 1991)
(Sacramento's program has a five year restriction but also stipulates that if a home were sold
within five years of the initial purchase, a portion of the appreciation would be paid to a
fund to reduce costs for future low- or moderate-income home buyers. This is a blend be-
tween a deed restriction and a recapture program.) For a discussion of recapture programs,
see infra text accompanying notes 93-95.
87. Many programs in California have some sort of permanent affordability restrictions.
For example, the Davis program requires that certain units be maintained in perpetuity as
inclusionary units. Davis, Cal., Ordinance 1567 (June 20, 1990).
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cost of capital and home improvements; and costs related to the sale
of the unit.88 Second, potential purchasers must qualify via appro-
priate income levels. Sometimes it is a seller's responsibility to pre-
screen potential purchasers. Other times, a housing agency or other
government agency is responsible.' Normally, if sellers cannot find
qualified buyers within a reasonable time period (generally defined in
each program), they may place their units on the open market, some-
times at a controlled price.91
Some programs have "rolling" resale restrictions whereby the
term of affordability rolls over .each time a unit is sold.' So if a
unit had a ten year affordability term and the owner sold it prior to
the expiration of that period, the ten year term would commence
anew at the time of the sale.
Another method of maintaining the stock of affordable housing
and preventing windfalls in favor of sellers is through a recapture
mechanism. Recapture provisions allow the owner of an inclusionary
unit to sell that unit on an open market.93 There is no windfall be-
cause the seller must pay to a housing or government agency the
difference between the purchase price and a pre-determined amount.
The pre-determined amount is typically similar to the amount which
the seller can obtain under resale restrictions (i.e., the initial purchase
price plus appreciation, cost of improvements, and sales costs).' The
agency is then responsible for using these funds to either subsidize
housing for low- and moderate-income families, or to otherwise ob-
88. Santa Cruz's price formula, which is typical, provides:
a. The allowable resale price will be set according to a formula established by
Council resolution. The final sales price shall be adjusted according to the criteria
listed in b, below, provided that in no case shall the maximum allowable sales
price be lower than the purchase price of the unit at the time of its last sale plus
the seller's closing costs and titie insurance.
b. The purchase price of any affordable unit may be increased by:
The value of any substantial structural or permanent fixed improvements which
cannot be removed without substantial damage to the premises or substantial or
total loss of value of said improvements . . . and such adjustment cannot increase
the resale price herewith allowed by more than ten percent.
SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE ORDINANCE 91-45, § 5 (1992) (amending § 24.16.057 of
ch. 24.16 of Title 24 of the Municipal Code).
89. For a detailed discussion of the mechanics of resale controls, including administra-
tion of same, see MALLACH, supra note 14, at 150-58.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 152.
92. See, e.g., MONTEREY COUNTY, CAL., ORDINANCE ch. 18.40, § 18A0.050 (1994).
93. See MALLACH, supra note 14, at 155-56.
94. Id.
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tain a substitute unit for the lost inclusionary unit.9'
There are two major benefits to the recapture approach. First, it
responds to the objection that resale controls overly regulate the free
markete 6 by allowing an owner to sell a unit to any willing buyer, at
a price determined by the market. Second, it prevents a seller from
obtaining a windfall profit.
Recapture programs are intended to preserve inclusionary units
because the "windfall" amount is supposed to be used for affordable
housing.97 However, they do not automatically provide a substitute
inclusionary unit for the unit that is lost to the open market. Further-
more, the amount that is recaptured certainly is not adequate to build
another inclusionary unit.98 At best, it will be part of a fund that is
used to subsidize housing. Since recapture provisions are not as com-
mon as other resale restrictions," there is insufficient evidence to
determine whether they provide adequate funding to develop new
inclusionary units at a level adequate to make up for lost inclusionary
units.
Developers tend to build rental units under inclusionary housing
programs with federal or state subsidies or assistance. As a condition
to receiving such subsidies or assistance, the government builds in
controls to ensure that units are made available to very low-, low-,
and moderate-income persons."t If rental units are built as part of
an inclusionary housing scheme without federal or state subsidies and
their accompanying institutionalized regulations for maintaining
affordability, program administrators can easily look to federal or
95. California Assembly Member Bomstein has proposed an amendment to Government
Code § 65915 (the density bonus section), which contains a recapture mechanism of sorts.
The bill provides that developers are responsible for ensuring the long-term affordability of
low-income target units for at least ten years. A.B. 2206, 55th Sess. (Cal. Reg. Sess. 1993)
(at proposed § 65915(c)(2)) [hereinafter Proposed CA AB 2206]. If a target unit owner sells
that unit to a non-qualified household (i.e., one that is not low-income) within ten years from
the date of the original sale, that seller would be responsible for paying an amount calculated
pursuant to a formula set forth in the bill to the supervising city, county, or city and county.
Id.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 210.
97. See MALLACH, supra note 14, at 156-57.
98. Id.
99. However, some inclusionary housing and density bonus programs incorporate recap-
ture provisions. See, e.g., Monterey, Developer's Guide, supra note 85, F; Proposed CA
AB 2206, supra note 95; Proposed MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.7(a)(7).
100. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 813.102 to .103 (1993) (The HUD Section 8 Rent Subsidy
Program which establishes income eligibility guidelines.); 24 C.F.R. § 813.107 (1993) (same
program, which establishes maximum monthly housing costs).
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state programs for guidance in preserving units as affordable hous-
ing.' However, it is questionable whether rental units in an
inclusionary housing program can sustain their initially low rents on a
long term basis without a subsidy, given the increased maintenance
costs over the life of a rental project and unforeseen increases in
operating costs."
The success of inclusionary housing programs depends on a
number of factors, including the specific details of a program and a
program's ability to balance the production of affordable housing with
incentives adequate to ensure profitability to developers. Efficient and
knowledgeable program -administration is also important, as is positive
receptivity to inclusionary housing by both the local government and
population.
D. The Proposed MIHO
The California legislature recently considered adopting a manda-
tory statewide inclusionary housing ordinance. 3 Under the Proposed
MIHO, California's Department of Housing and Community Develop-
ment ("HCD") would be responsible for the development of a model
mixed-income housing opportunities ordinance, which would then be
effective for every local government within the state that did not have
its own inclusionary housing program by a given date."° Local gov-
ernments would be free to adopt their own mixed-income housing
ordinance, so long as they complied with specified standards." This
section will describe the details of the Proposed MIHO.
101. See, e.g., Long Beach, Cal., Ordinance C-6829, § 1 (Nov. 30, 1990) (amending
§ 21.60.090, (1)(1)(b) of the Long Beach Municipal Code), which requires that units be
rented to:
persons who either meet the standards for rent subsidy established by HUD pursu-
ant to Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937, as amended, or to persons who
meet the requirements of other rent subsidy or funding program, acceptable to the
Authority, that provides rental housing for low income households.
Il It also mandates that a developer use best efforts to accomplish the intent of the chapter.
Such efforts include "entering into contracts offered by HUD, the Housing Authority or other
such agency administering a rent subsidy program; or, refraining from taking any action to
terminate any rent subsidy programs entered into:' Id. (amending § 21.60.090, 1 (E)(2)).
102. For example, most apartment projects need substantial repairs after 10-15 years, such
as new roofs, carpeting, and appliances. There also may be major operating cost increases
resulting from unanticipated events such as compliance with new laws like those dealing with
droughts, asbestos removal, disabilities, etc.
103. See Proposed MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.5(c).
104. Id. § 65853.7(b)-(c).
105. /a § 65853.7(a)(l)-(10).
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The model ordinance, as well as local ordinances, would general-
ly apply only to new construction of ten or more units. The Proposed
MIHO would establish a rebuttable presumption that it is financially
feasible for local governments to require developers to produce a
minimum of ten percent of the ownership units in new residential
development areas for sale to households with incomes at or below
ninety percent of area median income, and ten percent of the rental
units in new residential development areas for rental to households
with incomes at or below seventy percent of area median income."
A local ordinance would have to "require that a minimum per-
centage of housing units in new residential developments be made
available to lower to median income households.""° Prior to speci-
fying program details, a local government would have to conduct a
feasibility study to determine both the income levels to which units
would be targeted, and the requisite percentage of targeted units."0
As part of the feasibility study, the locality would be charged with
determining the range of income levels the program could serve with-
out public subsidies."0 In addition, it would:
[C]ompare the affordable prices and rents that households in the
area with very low, low, and median incomes, adjusted for family
size, can afford, and the prices and rents of the typical owner and
rental units currently built by the private market, adjusted by alter-
native size units. The feasibility analysis shall identify and quantify
the value of the proposed reforms and incentives."'
Local ordinances would thus require developers to set aside a
targeted percentage of inclusionary units based on the feasibility
106. Id. § 65853.7(). This is a fair provision because it allows local governments to
provide evidence that the presumption is not financially feasible. In that event, a developer
can negotiate a financially feasible set-aside percentage.
107. Id. § 65853.7(a)(2)(A).
108. Id.
[T]he local agency shall undertake an economic feasibility analysis, or may rely on
information and analysis, provided by the council of governments, the county, or
the surrounding city or cities, that ascertains the range of income levels that the
private market can reasonably be expected to serve without a public subsidy, but
including the financial benefits obtained from the utilization of the reforms and
incentives provided for in this section.
Id.
109. Id. § 65853.7(a)(2)(A).
110. Id. § 65853.7(a)(2)(B).
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study.' The actual income levels of recipients should be the lowest
and the targeted percentage of units should be the highest that could
be provided without a public subsidy, taking into account regulatory
reforms and incentives."2 A local ordinance could establish that a
larger targeted figure than that determined by the feasibility analysis
could be built without subsidies, if the ordinance offered developers
public subsidies or adequate incentives to offset the costs of comply-
ing with the ordinance."'
The Proposed MIHO, and local ordinances enacted under it,
would have to contain a package of incentives and regulatory reforms
designed to offset costs a developer would incur to comply with the
ordinance."4 These would include any reforms and incentives specif-
ically proposed by an affordable housing advisory committee created
pursuant to the Proposed MIHO,"' including, if appropriate:
(i) density bonuses of at least 25 percent more than what maximum
zoning and state law would allow; (ii) reduced street width, parking,
sidewalk, floor area ratio, zero-lot line, and set-back standards; (iii)
111.
Consistent with its feasibility analysis, the local agency shall, in an ordinance, re-
quire a minimum percentage of the units in . . . new residential development areas
to be sold to persons who have low to median incomes, and a minimum percent-
age of the units in residential rental projects to be rented to persons who have
very low to low incomes, pursuant to Section 50079.5 of the Health and Safety
Code. "Affordable rent" shall be defined as provided for in Section 50053 of the
Health and Safety Code, and "affordable housing cost for homeownership" shall be
defined as provided for in Section 50052.5 of the Health and Safety Code.
Id. § 65853.7(a)(3).
112. Id. § 65853.7(a)(2)(C).
113. Id. § 65853.7(a)(2)(D). As is evident, many of the Proposed MIHO requirements are
designed to compensate developers for foregone sales of market rate units through various
incentives.
114. Id. § 65853.7(a)(4).
115. The Proposed MIHO specifies that a local agency which adopts its own ordinance
"may create and appoint an affordable housing advisory committee to assist the local agency
in preparing a mixed-income housing opportunities ordinance that meets the targeting and
financial feasibility goals of this subdivision." Id § 65853.7(a)(5)(A). It continues:
(B) Any advisory committee created pursuant to this paragraph shall reflect
the ethnic, gender, and geographical diversity of the county in which the local
agency is located, and shall reflect the diversity of policy interests with expertise
related to: (i) residential home building; (ii) banking; (iii) labor, (iv) advocacy for
low-income persons; (v) affordable housing; (vi) real estate; or (vii) advocacy for
fair housing.
(C) The advisory committee shall review the proposed policy, including the
proposed regulatory reforms and incentives, at a public hearing, and shall make
recommendations to the local agency.
Id. § 65853.7(a)(5)(B)-(C).
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smaller lots and unit sizes; (iv) design standard modifications for the
targeted units; (v) a mix of housing types, including attached units,
condominiums, second units, and duplexes; (vi) priority processing;
(vii) fee waivers or deferrals; and (viii) development as of right of
4,000 square foot lots in up to 25 percent of the development." 6
The Proposed MIHO requires developers to meet with local
agencies to determine the availability of subsidies. Developers must
accept such subsidies, if available.'
The Proposed MIHO contains resale restrictions which are de-
signed to balance an inclusionary unit owner's right to profitably sell
that unit, with the retention of inclusionary units. It provides:
The local agency shall monitor the ownership units for at least five
years after initial occupancy in order to prevent a windfall profit to
the owner of a targeted unit. If the unit is sold in five or fewer
years, if the initial sale price of the unit was less than or equal to
50 percent of the average price of all units in the development, and
if the rate of appreciation on the targeted unit exceeds the average
rate of appreciation for single-family ownership units in the area,
then the local agency shall capture 50 percent of the equity generat-
ed by the gap between the market sales price and the initial sales
price of the unit. The local agency shall use all captured equity for
the development of additional affordable housing within the jurisdic-
tion."
8
116. Id. § 65853.7(a)(4)(B).
117. Proposed MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.7(a)(6) provides in part as follows:
If the local agency determines that these housing subsidies are available, the devel-
oper shall be required to accept and use the subsidy funds to make the targeted
owner or rental units, or additional targeted units, affordable to households with
income lower than provided for in paragraph (3), and shall be required to keep the
units affordable for the period of time specified under the terms and conditions of
the subsidy funds.
Id.; see also id. § 65853.7(b). These provisions are also designed to ensure that developers
can profitably construct inclusionary units.
118. Id. § 65853.7(a)(7). The resale restrictions as drafted have a number of problems.
For example, they state that a local agency will monitor units for five years. But they do not
specify how to monitor ownership and should give some guidance. The restrictions are also
very cumbersome, unwieldy, and inefficient. If a unit is sold within five years after purchase,
a local agency must go through a complex exercise in fact-gathering and formula application.
It must determine the average sales price of all units in the development (during what time
period-all initial sales prices, all sales prices within one year of the date that a below mar-
ket rate owner sells, all sales prices in the history of the development?) and calculate the
rate of appreciation of the unit at issue, as well as the average rate of appreciation of all
single family homes in the area (what area and during which period?). Once these imperfect
calculations are made, depending on whether the initial sales price was less than or equal to
fifty percent of the average sales price, and whether the appreciation on the targeted unit
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Under the Proposed MIHO, developers would be required to
construct inclusionary units throughout a new residential development.
Furthermore, all units within a new development would have to con-
tain similar features:" 9
The local agency shall require all targeted units to be dispersed
throughout the project and have substantially the same exterior ap-
pearance so they are not easily identified, and shall require targeted
units to have a similar number of bedrooms typical in the
nontargeted units. Targeted units may differ in lot or unit size, have
fewer and less expensive interior finishes and amenities, and be of
different housing types, including but not limited to, attached units,
duplexes, condominiums, manufactured housing, second units, half-
plexes, and multifamily units. The agency shall require each devel-
opment phase to include a proportional number of targeted units.'
There are some alternatives to building inclusionary units on-
site.' 2' First, if it is not economically feasible to build inclusionary
units on-site, a developer can build the units off-site subject to a
number of conditions.' Second, if it is not economically feasible to
build inclusionary units off-site, a developer can donate land."
exceeded a certain amount, the local agency would recapture fifty percent of the difference
between the initial sales price and the market sales price. A deed restriction would be sim-
pler to administer and would preserve an inclusionary unit, rather than allowing it to be lost
by a sale on the open market. This is not intended to be an exhaustive critique of this pro-
vision; rather, it is intended to point out apparent flaws.
119. Id. § 65853.7(a)(8) (emphasis added).
120. Id. The term "half-plex" was apparently "made up" and was intended to identify
separate units sharing a common wall. Telephone Interview with.Toni Simons, Senior Consul-
tant, Assembly Committee on Housing and Community Development, State Assembly of
California, May 24, 1994. It seems a half-plex is the same as a duplex.
121. Proposed MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.7(a)(9)-(10).
122. "The offsite targeted units shall be built concurrently with the nontargeted units,
shall be located in the same specific plan area, community plan area, neighborhood, or plan-
ning area as the nontargeted units, and shall not be located in an area which has an
overconcentration of affordable housing." Id. § 65853.7(a)(9).
123.
The local agency may permit the developer to dedicate land to the local
agency, local housing authority, or nonprofit housing developer if the land to be
dedicated already has local agency approvals necessary to construct housing units,
is sufficient in size and equivalent in value and cost to provide the required num-
ber of targeted units for the proposed project, has sufficient infrastructure that is
onsite or easily accessible, is free of environmental constraints, is located in the
same specific plan area, community plan area, neighborhood or planning area as
the nontargeted units, and is not located in an area which has an overconcentration
of affordable housing.
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Third, developers can pay an in-lieu fee.24
A final feature of the Proposed MIHO is that interested parties
can request that the Affordable Housing Review Committee"z re-
view a local ordinance to determine whether it meets targeting and
feasibility requirements. 26 The Committee would then:
review the local agency's policy, including the proposed regulatory
concessions and incentives, at a public hearing and make recom-
mendations to the director. The committee's and director's determi-
nations shall be made on the basis of substantial evidence in the
record. In cases where either the committee or the director finds
that a local agency's mixed-income housing opportunities policy
does not meet state targeting or financial feasibility goals, it may
suspend the application of that policy and apply the department's
model ordinance, or may apply alternative targeting goals that are
financially feasible."
Dozens of organizations, including affordable housing advocates,
legal aid groups and other social service entities, support the Proposed
MIHO. It is opposed by the California: Building Industry Association
and the California State Association of Counties." It is part of a
three-bill package on growth management129 that includes Senate
Constitutional Amendment 19 which concerns majority vote
bonds, 3' and Senate Bill 377 which sets forth a comprehensive state
conservation and development policy."' Thus, it will not proceed to
the governor unless the state legislature arrives at an agreement on all
Id. § 65853.7(a)(10). The odds of complying with all of the foregoing seem marginal at best.
Since this second alternative is an unrealistic option, it should be omitted from the MIHO or
revised to offer a more practical option.
124.
The local agency may permit payment of an in-lieu fee for developments in
situations in which a fraction of an affordable unit would otherwise be required,
and for developments of fewer than 50 units in which the ordinance would pro-
duce a small number of units. The in-lieu fee shall be adequate to finance the
development of the target units, as described in this section, including land pur-
chase within 2 years of initiation of construction of the development.
Id. § 65853.7(a)(9).
125. Id. § 65853.7(d) (This Committee is established pursuant to the proposed bill.).
126. Id. § 65853.7(e).
127. Id.
128. ASSEMBLY COMIrrTEE ON HOUSING AND COMMUNrrY DEVELOPMENT, REPORT ON
A.B. 1684 6 (Apr. 21, 1993).
129. Proposed MIHO, supra note 14.
130. S.C.A. 19, 55th Sess. (Cal. 1993).
131. S.B. 377, 55th Sess. (Cal. 1993).
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three bills.
In spring 1993, the bill containing the Proposed MIHO was read
before the Assembly Committee on Housing and Community Devel-
opment and the Assembly Committee on Ways and Means, each of
which voted in its favor. It was then referred to the Senate Commit-
tee on Housing and Urban Affairs, from which it was withdrawn, and
then re-referred to the Senate Committee on Local Government.
32
1I. POLICY REASONS IN SUPPORT OF INCLUSIONARY HOUSING
Housing should be produced for persons of all income levels.
The biggest strength of inclusionary housing is that it produces sorely
needed low- and moderate-income housing. As of July 22, 1992, vari-
ous developers and agencies had produced at least 21,331 inclusionary
units under inclusionary housing programs in California.' 3   Since
most new development is in the suburbs,'" inclusionary housing
programs provide affordable housing where it has traditionally not
been available. This is significant because inclusionary housing in-
creases integration and reduces some of the pressure on cities (espe-
cially inner cities) by shifting a portion of strained city resources to
communities better equipped financially to handle the needs of low-
and moderate-income families.'35 There are many other policy rea-
sons in support of inclusionary housing, which will be elaborated in
this section. For example, it provides a viable alternative to housing
which is 100% publicly financed. 36 It also provides a healthier job
and housing balance because it provides more jobs close to employ-
ment centers. This, in turn, has a positive economic impact because it
reduces costs related to commuting (actual commuter costs and envi-
132. Because the Proposed MIHO did not pass during the 1993-94 Congressional session,
it was automatically killed at the end of the session. With the current political climate, it is
unlikely that Assemblyman Hauser will re-introduce the bill anytime soon.
133. CA IH SURVEY, supra note 54. Note, however, that not all inclusionary housing
programs are equal. For example, as of the time of the survey, a few localities had produced
a substantial number of units (Davis, Irvine, and Orange Counties had produced 1000, 4202
and 6389 inclusionary units, respectively), 13 localities had not produced any units, and the
remaining localities produced an average of about 271 units each (eliminating the above three
localities and any locality which produced no units). Id.
134. Among other reasons, downtown land is scarcer than suburban land and many cities
have already reached their saturation point.
135. See, e.g., John A. Baade, Note, Required Low-Income Housing in Residential Devel-
opments: Constitutional Challenges to a Community Imposed Quota, 16 ARiz. L. REV. 439,
439-40 n.2 (1974).
136. Inclusionary housing admittedly is partially publicly-financed, even if indirectly.
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ronmental costs), as well as labor costs (employee absenteeism and
moving costs that must be incurred if there is an inadequate employee
base). And finally, inclusionary housing, through resale and rental
restrictions, has the ability not only to provide affordable housing, but
also to preserve affordable housing.
One of the effects of inclusionary housing is increased integra-
tion vis-a-vis housing. Federal policy supports socio-economic integra-
tion.37 Courts also support integration as implied by decisions inval-
idating exclusionary housing.'38 Various courts have in fact extended
the promotion of economic integration through housing to include
racial integration.'39 Many scholars and advocates for ethnic minori-
ties also support integrated housing.""4 The Proposed MIHO explicit-
137. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat.
633 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 20, 42, and 49 U.S.C. (1988)).
138. See, e.g., Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983); Mount Laurel 1, 336 A.2d
713 (N.J. 1975); Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 300 A.2d 107 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973). Scholars also impliedly support integration, as evidenced by their lam-
entations over the problems which result from exclusionary zoning. "There are serious demor-
alization costs generated by social immobility and social unrest. Low- and moderate-income
people concentrated in economically segregated neighborhoods are denied the full range of
opportunities available to the middle and upper classes." Stockman, supra note 14, at 546;
see also Lawrence 0. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969).
139. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1294 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); United States v. City of Black
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
140. See, e.g., ANTHONY DowNs, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR
AMERICA 82 (1973); SEGREGATION, supra note 35, at 16; Bruce L. Ackerman, Integration for
Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. REv. 245,
266-69 (1974); Michael H. Schill, Deconcentrating the Inner City Poor, 67 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 795, 808 (1991). Racially mixed residential areas provide more economical use of com-
munity facilities. Further,
residential contact would afford people the opportunity to judge others on individu-
al merit rather than racial stereotypes, resulting in fuller utilization of manpower
and leadership resources. In addition, reduction of prejudicial attitudes toward the
minority group would provide them with benefits ranging from increased proximity
to work to better quality education, housing and other services.
SEGREGATION, supra note 35, at 16. Note, however, that some commentators question whether
integration is socially desirable. One commentator argues that it may interfere with localism.
Stockman, supra note 14, at 559. Others argue that racial integration could harm racial
groups by diluting both voting and general support powers, as well as engendering hostility
between those who leave and those who stay behind. SEGREGATION, supra note 35, at 16.
Also, homogeneity purportedly correlates with "less violent crime, less property crime, better
academic performance by students, less rancorous conflict in public decision-making, more
fiscal integrity in the community's budget process, and closer congruity between public
opinion and governmental policy." Stockman, supra note 14, at 561 (quoting G. Alan Tan &
Russell S. Harrison, Legitimacy and Capacity in State Supreme Court Policymaking: The New
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ly states that one of the goals of the program is to "[c]reate increased
ethnic and economic integration throughout each community."'
4'
Most inclusionary housing programs require that inclusionary units be
dispersed throughout a new development, rather than clustered togeth-
er. This promotes mixed income neighborhoods at the same time that
it allays arguments and fears of NIMBY vocalists and affordable
housing opponents. 42 If affordable housing is more evenly distribut-
ed among market priced units, it can give lower economic classes
access to better educational opportunities, discourage economic segre-
gation, and avoid concentration of affordable housing in already
blighted sections of cities and counties.
143
Concentration of [affordable] units is considered undesirable because
experience with large-scale, low-income housing projects indicates
that they tend to deteriorate both physically and socially, and fre-
quently become unsafe for residents as well as the surrounding
neighborhood. It is believed that scattering affordable units through-
out conventional projects may avoid these problems by encouraging
better tenant maintenance, increased community acceptance, and
higher quality construction.'"
Dispersing inclusionary units development-wide, combined with de-
signing such units to match the market rate units, is more palatable to
residents with NIMBY attitudes. This diminishes the possibility that
inclusionary units will negatively impact property values. Community
opposition to the production of affordable housing through
Jersey Court and Exclusionary Zoning, 15 RUTGERS LJ. 513, 562-63 (1984)). Thus by
inference, integration would not correlate with those benefits. However, it seems that the
homogeneity "advantages" described by Stockman would only be valid if the homogeneous
group described is a middle- or upper-class group. Others support economic integration gen-
erally, but believe that it should be accomplished through housing at the community rather
than at the neighborhood level. See generally NINA J. GRUEN & CLAUDE GRUEN, LOW AND
MODERATE INcoME HOUSING IN THE SUBURBS, AN ANALYSIS FOR THE DAYTON, OHIO
REGION 119-45 (1972).
141. Proposed MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.5(c)(2).
142. The MIHO program was designed in part to "[cireate less neighborhood opposition
to affordable housing as a result of not having to wedge affordable housing into existing
built up areas." Id. § 65853.5(c)(5).
143. Linda J. Bozung, A Positive Response to Growth Control Plans: The Orange County
Inclusionary Housing Program, 9 PEPP. L. REv. 819, 831-32 (1982) [hereinafter Boztng, A
Positive Response]; Thomas Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances-Policy and Legal Issues in Re-
quiring Private Developers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 UCLA L. REV., 1432, 1458
(1974).
144. Linda J. Bozung, Inclusionary Housing: Experience Under a Model Program, ZON-
ING & PLAN. L. REp. (Jan. 1983), at 91 [hereinafter Bozung, Inclusionay Housing].
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inclusionary housing programs should therefore decrease. By spread-
ing inclusionary units throughout a community, inclusionary housing
could accomplish economic, as well as racial, integration.
Suburban integration is merely a subset of the foregoing, apply-
ing specifically to suburban areas that have traditionally been homo-
geneous with respect to income and race to a significantly greater
degree than cities."5 The benefits of suburban integration have been
succinctly described as follows:
1. Better access to expanding suburban job opportunities for workers
in low- and moderate-income households-especially the unem-
ployed
2. Greater opportunities for such households to upgrade themselves
by moving into middle-income neighborhoods, thereby escaping
from crisis ghetto conditions
3. Higher quality public schooling for children from low-income
households who could attend schools dominated by children from
middle-income households
4. Greater opportunity for the nation to reach its officially adopted
goals for producing improved housing for low- and moderate-income
households
5. Fairer geographic distribution of the fiscal and social costs of
dealing with metropolitan-area poverty
6. Less possibility of major conflicts in the future caused by con-
frontations between two spatially separate and unequal societies in
metropolitan areas
7. Greater possibilities of improving adverse conditions in crisis
ghetto areas without displacing urban decay to adjacent neighbor-
hoods. "
Since most new housing is developed in suburban areas rather
than in central cities, the integration impact of inclusionary housing
will be strongest in the suburbs. 47 If one accepts the proposition
that integration is a desirable goal, then inclusionary housing should
certainly be supported as a means not only of providing affordable
housing, but also of furthering social and economic integration in
145. Kleven, supra note 143, at 1435-36 (Kleven notes that subsidized housing had tradi-
tionally not been built in the suburbs probably due to exclusionary land use regulations, high
land prices, and developers' general desires to maximize profits. In addition, suburban areas
generally have less used-housing than urban areas, so filtering works less efficiently.). For a
general discussion of filtering, see infra text accompanying notes 222-29.
146. DowNs, supra note 140, at 26.
147. But see Stockman, supra note 14, at 566-68.
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traditionally segregated suburban areas.
Inclusionary housing can potentially spread the cost of providing
affordable housing over a number of parties, rather than placing the
burden primarily on the government. Housing for very low-, low-,
and moderate-income persons has admittedly not always been 100%
publicly financed.'48 But in light of governmental budget reductions
generally, and in the area of housing particularly, the possibility of
major public financing for affordable housing will further diminish.
While there has been federal funding for affordable housing programs
for decades, in the early 1980s, starting with the Reagan administra-
tion and continuing through the Bush administration, the federal role
in the production of affordable housing has decreased to the point of
being insignificant. "9 Thus, it is more important than ever to devel-
op alternate .solutions to the affordable housing problem. Inclusionary
housing is one solution which shifts the burden of providing afford-
able housing from federal and state government to local governments
and developers. In addition, it has the potential of providing a wider
base of support for affordable housing by forcing private developers,
public agencies, and non-profit entities, among others, to work togeth-
er.
California's Proposed MIHO is representative of this spirit as it
was intended to:
provide a prudent, economically sound way, when combined with
regulatoiy reforms and incentives, to increase the long-term supply
of affordable housing without imposing unrealistic burdens on local
government services, without saddling the private sector with unrea-
sonable requirements that impair its ability to provide affordable
housing, and without diverting valuable public services from their
most effective use. 5
To illustrate, even though inclusionary housing programs require
148. MALLACH, supra note 14, at 6-11.
149. In discussing housing problems generally, one housing expert noted:
The above perceived [housing] failures and frustrations pale, however, by compari-
son with that experienced during the period following 1980, as the Reagan admin-
istration effectively eliminated over a period of less than three years any meaning-
ful federal role in the production of new housing for low- and moderate-income
households. It has long been recognized that with isolated and typically sporadic
exceptions, neither state nor local government was capable of providing funding for
housing programs in any manner capable of replacing the lost federal funds.
IM at 5-6. See generally HAYS, supra note 19, at 239-66.
150. Proposed MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.5(b)(1).
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developers to provide affordable housing, they typically provide in-
centives to the developers and frequently work with them to deter-
mine if any government financing, subsidies, or other forms of assis-
tance are available for a particular project.' Thus, inclusionary
housing provides an additional source of affordable housing from a
partnership of many parties, rather than placing the burden all on the
government.
Recently, there has been a significant trend toward relocating
low-skilled jobs to the suburbs, leaving cities with more professional
and managerial jobs and fewer low-skilled jobs."' When employers
with many low-skilled jobs move their operations to suburban areas
where affordable housing is not available for many of their employ-
ees, a housing-job imbalance arises. 3 This imbalance is exacerbated
by prevalent suburban exclusionary zoning practices. These practices
encourage commercial development, which produces favorable tax
rateables.'" At the same time, they discourage affordable housing
development, because affordable housing produces less revenue than
commercial development or higher priced homes, and it houses resi-
dents who have traditionally used greater than average municipal
services.'55 Inclusionary housing advocates point out that one of the
advantages of inclusionary housing is that it promotes a greater job
and housing balance by increasing access to employment centers for
low- and moderate-income persons." 6 In addition to moderating the
housing-job imbalance by providing affordable housing close to em-
ployment centers, inclusionary housing programs also produce related,
151. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 117.
152. Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L. REV.
1351, 1373-76 (1993).
153. Stockman, supra note 14, at 543.
154. David G. Andersen, Urban Blight Meets Municipal Manifest Destiny: Zoning at the
Ballot Box, the Regional Welfare, and Transferable Development Rights, 85 Nw. U. L. REV.
519, 557 (1991) (noting that commerce generally adds more revenue to the tax base than it
consumes by using municipal services).
155. Stockman, supra note 14, at 540.
156. Mary E. Brooks, Housing Trust Funds: Lessons from Inclusionary Zoning, in
INCLUSIONARY ZONING MovEs DowNToWN 7, 10 (Dwight Merriam et al. eds., 1985); Paul
Davidoff & Linda Davidoff, Opening the Suburbs: Toward Inclusionary Land Use Controls,
22 SYRACuSE L. REv. 509, 513 (1971). Brooks points out that one of the original selling
points of inclusionary zoning was that it provided increased access to employment opportuni-
ties. In discussing the housing-job imbalance, she noted that "[w]hile employment centers
were then rapidly expanding in suburban areas, low and moderate-income housing, affordable
to many employees, was virtually non-existent.... Inclusionary zoning ordinances worked to
provide a greater balance between available employment and available housing." Id.
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desirable side effects of saving time and energy, which in turn de-
creases employee absenteeism and environmental damage.'57
The Proposed MIHO would simultaneously alleviate the housing-
job imbalance and "improve air quality, reduce traffic congestion,
increase the labor pool, and allow shorter commutes between work
and home by providing affordable housing for employees that is
closer to their jobs."'5 When the economy is depressed like it is
presently, especially in California, inclusionary housing could provide
positive side effects. For example, it could preserve jobs in the state
by allowing employers to attract employees with the promise of af-
fordable housing.' Among the findings in the Proposed MIHO was
that "[t]he shortage of decent, affordable housing makes it difficult to
create, expand, and retain businesses, thereby threatening the state's
economic future. ' '1"" Thus, the Proposed MIHO and inclusionary
housing programs generally, can help correct the housing-jobs imbal-
ance, thereby retaining both employers and employees, and injecting a
needed boost into the California economy.
Many compelling reasons support inclusionary housing, the most
significant being the production of affordable housing. The reasons
justifying inclusionary housing are strengthened by the crisis evi-
denced by the affordable housing shortage,' the skyrocketing num-
bers of homeless persons, and the lack of existing or planned solu-
tions to this problem. 62
IV. INCLUSIONARY HOUSING CRITCIsMs: CRACKS IN THE
FOUNDATIONS
There are many policy reasons against, and criticisms of,
inclusionary housing programs. This section will examine these con-
cerns and criticisms, ultimately concluding that some of them are
illusory, and that the remaining valid problems of inclusionary hous-
ing do not outweigh its benefits.
Some of the primary arguments against inclusionary housing are
157. Bozung, Inclusionary Housing, supra note 144, at 90.
158. Proposed MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.5(b)(4).
159. Bozung, Inclusionary Housing, supra note 144, at 90 ("Business enterprises demand
a nearby supply of employees and are often forced to leave a community when that employ-
ee supply dwindles as a result of escalating housing costs."); Davidoff & Davidoff, supra
note 156, at 513.
160. Proposed MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.5(a)(4).
161. MALLACH, supra note 14, at 9.
162. Dreier, supra note 152, at 1365.
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that it inhibits free market forces, redistributes wealth, and may even
operate as a hidden tax.1 Opponents argue that inclusionary hous-
ing programs pass the burden of solving a society-wide problem from
government to a small private sector, and that sector is neither di-
rectly, nor wholly, responsible for the problem." Resale controls
may be invalid restraints on alienation. Critics argue that inclusionary
housing can slow down, or halt, housing production altogether.65
Furthermore, while it may help some low- or moderate-income house-
holds, the number is relatively small compared with the number of
people who need affordable housing. This is exacerbated by the prob-
lem of qualifying for inclusionary units. There is a limited number of
people who earn enough to save for the requisite down payment and
qualify for a loan, but do not earn so much that they bump them-
selves from the program. There are related administrative problems
such as determining who qualifies for housing under a program, how
to prioritize qualified applicants, and how to restrict resales. Critics
also argue that it is inefficient to build brand new housing for low-
and moderate-income families when filtering" and other mecha-
nisms are available to provide affordable housing in a more cost
effective manner. Finally, many programs apply to all new develop-
ments.6 This is impractical in smaller developments.
Opponents of inclusionary housing argue that by its nature, it
functions to redistribute wealth. 6 Inclusionary housing forces a
small segment of the population to provide, and pay for, low cost
housing for select parties who would otherwise not be able to afford
such housing.69 The qualified parties who are selected to purchase
163. MALLACH, supra note 14, at 86.
164. Id. at 11. In discussing opposition to inclusionary housing, Mallach noted that
"[s]uch opposition was particularly apparent where observers perceived such programs as
being the means whereby government could shift the responsibility for problems, often of its
own making, off the public sector and onto the private sector to the development and home-
building industry." Id.
165. Id. at 88.
166. Filtering is a passive mechanism which provides used-housing which "filters"
through various income groups, with each successive group in a lower income bracket than
the preceding group. For a detailed description of filtering, see infra text accompanying notes
222-29.
167. Robert Collin & Michael Lytton, Linkage: An Evaluation and Exploration, 21 URB.
LAW. 413, 413 (1989); John M. Payne, Housing Impact Fees, 20 REAL EST. LJ. 75, 75
(1991).
168. MALLACH, supra note 14, at 86.
169. See, e.g., Ronald H. Silverman, Subsidizing Tolerance for Open Communities, 1977
Wis. L. REV. 375, 453.
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or rent inclusionary units benefit from inclusionary housing.70 The
more troubling issue is, at whose expense? There is neither a simple
nor a single answer. The response depends in large part on the me-
chanics of a particular program, as well as the community in which
the program is situated. There may be one primary "payor," but it is
more likely that there is a combination of payors, possibly including
developers, city or county governments, federal or state governments,
landowners, and market rate purchasers or renters in developments
subject to inclusionary housing. It is impossible to determine a precise
formula for allocation of costs in implementing an inclusionary pro-
gram. However, in order to fairly analyze this criticism of
inclusionary housing, it is appropriate to discuss the parties likely to
pay under given circumstances.
Wealth is redistributed from developers, who pay for inclusionary
housing if they receive a lower price for inclusionary units than they
would absent inclusionary housing requirements, unless they are other-
wise adequately compensated. Developers can be compensated through
a package of incentives. Alternatively, developers can "pass costs
backwards" to landowners by paying less for land subject to
inclusionary housing regulations than they would otherwise pay. Fi-
nally, developers can "pass costs forwards" to market rate buyers or
renters.
171
Local, state, and federal entities may offer a variety of incentives
to developers. For example, they can offer low interest financing or
bond programs that are intended to offset the costs imposed by an
inclusionary housing program. 71 One of the most common incen-
tives is a density bonus. In order for a density bonus to be effective,
it must allow a developer to build enough units so that the cost of
building inclusionary units can be recouped, at least in part, through
the production of more market rate units than would otherwise be
permitted.'73 Other common incentives fall under the rubric of zon-
170. While it is easy to identify who benefits, it is somewhat troubling to determine
which of the many qualified applicants will benefit. For a discussion of the mechanics of this
issue, see supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
171. Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167
(1981).
172. For a general discussion of incentives, see supra notes 69-70 and accompanying
text.
173. See Kathleen Morgan-Martinez, Local Control in Low-Income Development: The
Promise of California's Article 34, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 765 (1993); Serena M. Wil-
liams, The Need for Affordable Housing: The Constitutional Viability of Inclusionary Zoning,
26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 75, 86 (1992).
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ing code reforms, which may include tandem parking74 or reduced
parking stall depth and guest parking requirements, or reduced street
widths and set-back requirements. Inclusionary housing programs fre-
quently provide that inclusionary units may be smaller than market
rate units and offer fewer amenities.175 A locality may reduce or
waive development fees altogether."6 Local governments can also
expedite project processing which saves money, and as importantly,
time. Less tangible but every bit as important, a locality can engage
in community education to lessen fears and resistance to affordable
housing." There may also be other incentives or any combination
of the above-listed incentives.
If the value of incentives is not greater than the cost of comply-
ing with inclusionary housing requirements, rather than take a loss, a
developer can attempt to pass costs backward or forward.178 Costs
are passed backward if a developer pays less for land because it is
subject to inclusionary housing regulations.
In essence, the effect of an inclusionary housing program on land
value in a given zone, all other standards being held constant, is
identical to that of a downzoning of the same land. As the prospec-
tive income stream from the property is reduced, the value of the
land is proportionately diminished.'79
Thus, owners of undeveloped land may pay, at least in part, for
174. "A tandem parking space is a parking space that abuts a second parking space in
such a manner that vehicular-access to the second space can only be made through the abut-
ting (tandem) space" Theodore C. Taub, Transportation and Parking Regulations as Growth
Management, in LAND USE INSTITUTE: PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DO-
MAIN AND COMPENSATION 429, 499 (1989).
175. EUGENE J. MEEHAN, PUBLIC HOUSING POLICY: CONVENTION VERSUS REALrrY 34
(1975).
176. For a discussion on development fees, see Jane E. Schukoske, Housing Linkage:
Regulating Development Impact on Housing Costs, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1018 (1991).
177. The NIMBY Report made several suggestions directly related to education. For
example, Recommendation 8-2 provides:
The Commission recommends that government leaders and concerned organizations
and individuals build coalitions to support regulatory reform and affordable housing.
Professional and civic organizations should examine the consequences of the
NIMBY syndrome; private and community foundations should sponsor studies of
and debate on regulatory reform; and government officials should join with private
citizens to address the implications of NIMBYism. Government, business, nonprofit,
and educational leaders should take the lead in forming local coalitions to translate
public awareness into support for regulatory reform and affordable housing.
NIMBY REPORT, supra note 21, at 8-8, 8-9.
178. MALLACH, supra note 14, at 88.
179. Id. at 90.
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inclusionary housing. While this may seem unfair, the bundle of
rights obtained through property ownership"0 has generally not been
interpreted to include a right to a given rate of return on proper-
ty."' A landowner's risk of paying for inclusionary housing under
the above circumstances is no different than the risk of depreciation
generally inherent in real property ownership. For example, any prop-
erty can be down-zoned, a neighborhood may deteriorate, a commer-
cial route may be established through an area, etc. Regardless of the
foregoing, whether a developer can pass costs backward is not really
in the developer's control. It is more a function of the market and the
extent to which neighboring property is subject to inclusionary hous-
ing. If demand for land exceeds supply, undeveloped land will main-
tain its value or appreciate, even if it is subject to inclusionary hous-
ing. If all land in a given locality is subject to inclusionary housing,
then no particular parcel will be disproportionately impacted. There-
fore, the market, not the developer, controls land values.
A developer may also try to pass costs forward. Market rate
purchasers in a development subject to inclusionary housing may
subsidize inclusionary units if the developer increases the price of
their units to cover any losses incurred due to the production of
inclusionary units.' One of the stronger criticisms of inclusionary
housing programs is that it is inequitable for market rate buyers, who
180.
Real property includes the interests, benefits, and rights inherent in the own-
ership of physical real estate. Real property includes the "bundle of rights" that is
inherent in the ownership of real estate.
In the bundle of rights theory, ownership of real property is compared to a
bundle of sticks. Each stick represents a distinct and separate right, which may be
the right to use real estate, to sell it, to lease it, to enter it, to give it away, or to
choose to exercise more than one or none of these rights.
Berkeley Arms Apartment Corp. v. Hackensack City, 6 N.J. Tax 260, 282 (1983) (citing
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 8 (8th
ed. 1983)).
181. However, if government action prompts a takings question, the Supreme Court noted
that one factor which a court will consider as part of its analysis, is a property owner's "dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations," which are determined in part by a "reasonable rate of
return" on property. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 136-38
(1978). To the extent that a regulation deprives a property owner of the opportunity to earn
a reasonable rate of return, the regulation may be an unconstitutional taking. Nash v. City of
Santa Monica, 688 P.2d 894, 900 (Cal. 1984); Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542
N.E.2d 1059, 1065-66 (N.Y. 1989). But, in our case, the regulation would only indirectly
affect a landowner, and it is too far-fetched to entertain a takings analysis of such a chal-
lenge.
182. Ellickson, supra note 171, at 1190.
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may earn only marginally more than those who qualify for
inclusionary units, to pay a disproportionate share of the cost of
inclusionary programs.' 3 However, the possibility of market rate
units subsidizing inclusionary units is again dependent more on the
nature and status of the community, and the housing market in gener-
al, than any factor in a developer's control. For example, if a market
is fairly elastic and a home buyer has a choice of buying a three
bedroom home for $100,000 in City A which is subject to
inclusionary housing, or the same size home for $90,000 in City B
which is not subject to inclusionary housing, then all else being
equal, the home buyer almost certainly will buy in City B. It is only
if all is not equal that the buyer will pay a premium to live in City
A." In other words, a developer can pass inclusionary housing
costs forward only if a market is not perfectly elastic or a buyer is
willing to pay a premium for a home in an area that is subject to
inclusionary housing.' Thus, the economics of a given housing
market and the premium attached to certain communities will deter-
mine whether, and to what extent, a developer can pass inclusionary
housing costs on to market rate buyers.
Clearly, developers can charge more for any unit, regardless of
whether there is an inclusionary housing program, if the market justi-
fies that price. In this sense, excess costs attributable to inclusionary
housing programs can be analogized to exactions since they are
passed on to market rate purchasers in the same way in which exac-
tions for schools, sewers, etc., are passed along."t 6 It may not be
183.
Since home buyers of units in higher-density developments, which include
inclusionary housing, are assumed to be middle class rather than the rich who buy
in estate areas, which are usually not subject to such provisions, the system is said
to be particularly inequitable. The rich are getting off free and the middle classes
are carrying the entire burden.
Henry A. Hill, Government Manipulation of Land Values to Build Affordable Housing: The
Issue of Compensating Benefits, 13 REAL EST. L.J. 3, 13 (1984). Note, however, that estate
areas are generally no longer immune from affordable housing requirements because most
inclusionary housing programs contain regulations that apply to all new development within a
locality, not just particular projects. If it is economically infeasible to include inclusionary
units on site, most programs allow off-site production or in-lieu fees, but all new homes are
nonetheless affected.
184. See MALLACH, supra note 14, at 88-89.
185. Id. at 89-90. For example, Palo Alto is a very desirable place to live, partly be-
cause of its proximity to Stanford University. Thus, many people will pay a premium to buy
a house in Palo Alto, even if they could obtain a similar home for a lower price in nearby
Mountain View or Redwood City.
186. For a discussion of the exaction analogy in a legal context, see infra text accom-
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fair to all home buyers, but the transfer of these costs to home buy-
ers has been upheld.'
Assuming that a builder is able to earn acceptable profits, even
with inclusionary housing, there is no need to analyze further whether
inclusionary housing is fair vis-a-vis developers. Even if their profits
are not maximized, developers will still realize acceptable profits.
Therefore, developers will still develop.
If incentives are not adequate to compensate developers for com-
pliance costs, and if developers cannot pass costs backward or for-
ward, then there are two major consequences. The theoretical conse-
quence is that developers will pay a disproportionate amount of the
cost of solving the affordable housing problem. This is one of the
most forceful critiques of inclusionary housing.'88 The Supreme
Court has not directly addressed the general unfairness of this aspect
of inclusionary housing. In a takings context, however, it has stated
that "[o]ne of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is 'to bar
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."'189 Aside from the patent unfairness of the foregoing, if de-
velopers, by themselves, have to bear the cost of an inclusionary pro-
gram, the practical consequence is that there will be little or no new
development."'
As noted, however, it is unlikely that developers will incur sig-
nificant costs to comply with inclusionary housing requirements. Even
if some costs are incurred, the imposition of an inclusionary program
can be characterized as a cost of development. In that respect, exac-
tions arguably impose much more significant costs on developers than
inclusionary programs. "Indeed, there is a certain irony in many
builders' protests over the enactment of inclusionary housing pro-
grams, inasmuch as substantially greater costs, arguably serving the
public interest less, have long been recognized as a part of the cost
of doing business by the industry.''. Thus, developers will probably
be compensated for costs of complying with inclusionary housing
panying notes 362-67.
187. See infra text accompanying notes 362-65.
188. MALLACH, supra note 14, at 88.
189. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987) (citing
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). For a detailed discussion of the takings
issue, see infra part V.A.
190. MALLACH, supra note 14, at 88.
191. Id. at 95.
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through incentives. Even if not 100% compensated, any remaining
costs would simply be absorbed as a cost of doing business.
Developers are not the only party which may pay for
inclusionary housing. Local governments also pay part of the cost if
they provide developers with a package of incentives. Various incen-
tives impose different types of costs.
Some incentives, such as expedited processing, do not impose
any direct costs (although they may impose a cost on competing
developers who do not get those benefits). Other "indirect cost" in-
centives include assisting in obtaining federal or state grants, subsi-
dies, or bond-financing. This type of assistance really involves noth-
ing more than work which government employees would handle in
the normal course of their employment. While financing through tax-
free bonds imposes a cost on a very broad base, it does not impose a
direct cost on a local government. Incentives such as fee waivers,
reduced or waived infrastructure, or off-site improvement require-
ments, do not impose a direct cost on local governments, but may
impose an indirect cost.1" Otherwise, the benefit of inclusionary
housing could be gained through a tax on the community.193 A local
government may alternatively require such benefits from other devel-
opers, or they may simply be forfeited."9
Inclusionary housing critics have suggested that it would be more
equitable to pay for affordable housing through a general tax, rather
than to have a small segment of the population, such as developers,
pay for it.
With respect to the inclusionary ordinances, even if the need for
lower priced housing can be connected to new residential develop-
ment, it also arises from earlier residential and non-residential devel-
opment, and the benefits from filling the need flow more to the
community at large than to the particular developments. If costs
must be incurred to bring about the lower priced housing, it seems
192. If developers do not provide improvements which they would otherwise be required
to provide, the local government must provide them.
193. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53311-53365.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994) (cover-
ing California's Mello-Roos tax which funds public education, as well as other community
facilities).
194. For example, a community may pay if a school that might have been financed
through development fees is still built, but the funding for the school is provided through a
tax increase or special assessment, or through exactions paid by other developers. Or, if a
developer would normally be required to provide a school and the municipality waives that
requirement, then the community pays by both sacrificing the school and suffering overcrowd-
ing of existing schools.
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fairest that they be borne by the entire community through general
taxation.' 5
In response, it is likely that a general tax, even if fairer, would be so
unpopular that it would not be approved and few politicians would
risk their careers on such a proposal. Thus, even though a general tax
may be more equitable, it is not a realistic or viable alternative.
An inclusionary housing critic has argued that inclusionary pro-
grams are hidden "taxes on the production of new housing. The pro-
grams will usually increase general housing prices, a result which
further limits the housing opportunities of moderate-income families.
In short, despite the assertions of inclusionary zoning proponents,
most inclusionary ordinances are just another form of exclusionary
practice."'96 However, inclusionary programs often do not increase
housing prices of market rate units."9 If they do, the increase is
similar to that caused by exactions, and generally is not more than
the market will bear. So long as developers receive adequate incen-
tives, including density bonuses, it is more likely that general housing
prices will not increase. Thus, if programs are effectively designed,
they should not cause a general increase in housing prices.
Some people object to inclusionary housing because choosing
beneficiaries is too arbitrary and the class of beneficiaries is too limit-
ed.'98 While income is always a threshold qualifying standard, some
programs establish a priority system for qualified applicants based on
criteria such as current residence or employment within the locali-
ty.' Thus, with limited supply and great demand, there may be an
attempt to give priority to households deemed more "worthy." How-
ever, even among this narrower class, demand still exceeds supply. A
small percentage of this select group will be awarded homes which
they obtain at below market prices. But, compared to the tremendous
number of people who suffer as a result of the affordable housing
crisis, it is true that a relatively small number of people benefit from
these programs.2' There also is criticism that the limited group of
195. Kleven, supra note 143, at 1499.
196. Ellickson, supra note 171, at 1170.
197. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text; see also Holmdel Builders Ass'n v.
Township of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 294 (NJ. 1990) (arguing against the concept that
inclusionary housing programs serve as a tax on market rate units).
198. However, the same could be said about any entitlement program or about lotteries
for that matter.
199. See supra text accompanying note 80.
200. "[A]t one project site located in Orange County, 12,000 people applied to buy 392
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chosen beneficiaries is not necessarily the group with the greatest
need for affordable housing. It has been wryly noted that it is not
"evident that the decision [of who will receive inclusionary units] is
going to significantly help the urban poor; upwardly mobile urban
Yuppies perhaps, but not those on welfare or without a job.
2°1
With respect to the criticism that a small class benefits from
inclusionary housing, it is clear that a small group of beneficiaries is
better than no beneficiaries. Each household assisted by inclusionary
housing is a testament to the strength of inclusionary housing; it
provides housing otherwise not affordable to very low-, low-, and
moderate-income families.
The validity of the criticism that most inclusionary housing bene-
ficiaries are not those with the greatest need is questionable. There is
a need for housing for very low-, low-, and moderate-income house-
holds. If a program helps fill any of those needs, it is successful.
Furthermore, some programs intentionally target the class of beneficia-
ries attacked above (i.e., moderate-income households). For example,
a report analyzing the feasibility and need for an inclusionary housing
program specified that "[tjeachers, police officers, fire fighters, nurses,
secretaries and bank tellers are among those in need of affordable
housing in San Diego."' If inclusionary housing successfully fills
the need for moderate-income housing, then it may be appropriate to
alter some programs to target housing affordable to people in other
income categories. But, it is inappropriate to criticize a program be-
cause it only provides affordable housing for some people.
Although inclusionary housing programs have allowed moderate-
income families to purchase homes, they admittedly have not been as
successful at providing purchase opportunities for people in the lowest
income categories. 3 The main reasons are that most low-income
persons cannot qualify for financing of inclusionary units and acquire
the requisite down payment. Even if they can overcome these obsta-
cles, they cannot necessarily make their monthly payments or afford
upkeep on the units.' Inclusionary housing programs, however,
inclusionary units." Gary Smalker, Inclusionary Housing: A Wrong Approach, L.A. DAILY J.,
Nov. 16, 1981, § 1, at 4; see also MALLACH, supra note 14, at 19-20.
201. Richard F. Babcock, The Zoning Game-Revisited, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., Sept.
1985, at 145, 148.
202. SAN DIEGO INcLusIoNARY HOUSING TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT: CREATING A
MORE LIvABLE CO~MUNITY 6 (1992).
203. Brooks, supra note 156, at 14.
204. "The poor are too poor to own homes, even affordable ones." Donna Horowitz, Bid
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have succeeded in providing rental housing for very low- and low-in-
come households.' While inclusionary housing may not provide all
income groups an opportunity to purchase a home, more importantly,
it does provide affordable housing for those income groups with the
greatest need.
On the other' side of the income scale, people who earn just
above the moderate-income limitations imposed by inclusionary hous-
ing programs, make too much to qualify for inclusionary units.' In
discussing market rate purchasers, one commentator noted that "[i]n
most cases, these home buyers will consist of many people who,
although not members of the protected class of lower-income home
buyers, may be only marginally wealthier than the protected
class. , ,2°'
The criticism here is two-pronged. First, the class of people who
earn enough to qualify for a home loan, but do not earn so much that
they exceed the income ceiling limitations imposed by inclusionary
housing programs, is very small."5 This criticism seems unwarranted
insofar as the number of applicants for inclusionary units is generally
significantly higher than the number of available units. Program ad-
ministrators often must resort to a lottery to determine the lucky few
beneficiaries."°
The second criticism is that the line between those who qualify
for inclusionary housing and those who do not is arbitrary, thus re-
warding one group, but excluding another which may earn only mar-
ginally more than the qualifying group. This inequity can be com-
pounded if a locality funds incentives through general taxation, be-
cause then the group with an income just above the line is
disproportionately burdened (vis-a-vis higher income residents who
to Make Low-income Homes Attached Units, MARIN INDEP. J., Feb. 2, 1993, at Bl. This arti-
cle described a developer's request to convert proposed detached units to attached units based
on the concern that low- income families could not afford the upkeep on homes that would
have sold for about $80,000 under an inclusionary housing program, but would have other-
wise sold at the market rate of about $500,000. Id.
205. Monterey County has produced at least 90 low-income units, with construction of an
additional 700 units pending. Telephone Interview with Frank Brunings, Monterey County
Housing Coordinator (Jan. 25, 1994). Berkeley has produced 36 units under inclusionary
housing programs, with 32 additional units approved or under construction. Telephone Inter-
view with Nathan Landau, Berkeley Zoning Office (Jan. 25, 1994).
206. Babcock, supra note 201, at 148.
207. Hill, supra note 183, at 24.
208. MALLACH, supra note 14, at 20; Babcock, supra note 201, at 148.
209. See supra notes 79, 81 and accompanying text.
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pay proportionately less of their income for these taxes). It would
also be compounded if a developer passes costs forward to market
rate home buyers. These are valid criticisms. However, inclusionary
housing by itself cannot solve the affordable housing crisis, it can
only offer a partial solution. But, in light of the affordable housing
crisis, it would be imprudent to decline support of a program which
provides some affordable housing because it does not provide 100%
of such housing, and that an income class just above those benefitted
may be disproportionately impacted.
Resale restrictions provide fuel for the fire of inclusionary hous-
ing critics. While critics recognize that inclusionary housing programs
are designed to increase the stock of affordable housing through the
initial construction of inclusionary units and retention of them through
resale and other restrictions, they still object to resale restrictions for
a number of reasons. Their main objections are that the restrictions
interfere too much with the free market, take away one of the sticks
comprising the bundle of property rights, and are too hard to draft
and supervise.
The biggest concern with respect to resale restrictions is that they
represent too great a governmental intrusion into private property and
free market operations.10 Resale restrictions, like rent control restric-
tions, are criticized because they go too far in controlling land values.
They do artificially restrain appreciation of real property, thereby
burdening real property owners subject to such restrictions. However,
without resale restrictions, the success of inclusionary housing pro-
grams would be limited to a single generation of inclusionary unit
owners.
A related objection to resale controls stems from pro-property
right sentiments and the longstanding policy disfavoring unreasonable
restraints on alienation.21' Many real property owners have strong
convictions that they can do what they please with their property
(subject, of course, to reasonable regulations2 t2), including earning
210. MALLACH, supra note 14, at 147. However, many of the people who make this
argument would probably accept governmental involvement vis-a-vis zoning and other land
use regulations if such regulations maintain or enhance property values.
211. CAL. CIv. CODE § 711 (West 1994) ("Conditions restraining alienation, when repug-
nant to the interest created, are void."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 142 (1983)
(Part II, Direct Restraints on Alienation in Donative Transfers). For a discussion of the legal-
ity of resale restrictions, see infra part V.C.
212. It has long been recognized that in order to promote the general welfare, property
can be regulated. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428, 434-
36 (1934).
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the maximum return or appreciation on their property that the market
allows. Not surprisingly, some of the same property owners who
favor inclusionary programs when the programs allow them to buy
homes at affordable prices, later object to resale restrictions when
they want to sell their units. But for most inclusionary unit owners,
"the present opportunity to buy a home that they could otherwise not
afford far outweighs the future potential loss of windfall benefits. 2 3
Like most regulations, resale restrictions are not good for every-
body. The benefits of resale restrictions, however, outweigh their
burdens. Without resale restrictions, the affordable housing stock
created by inclusionary housing programs would disappear and a very
small group of homeowners would obtain a substantial windfall.
While it is difficult to formulate and supervise effective resale
controls,2"4 many governmental entities have done so successfully.
At a state level, legislation may be enacted which mandates that units
purchased pursuant to inclusionary housing programs remain available
as affordable housing if the state has provided subsidies or other
assistance for the housing. For example, California has a statute that
requires a locality to ensure the continued affordability of units within
a development if the locality has provided various types of assistance
or incentives." 5 Individual cities and counties currently regulate re-
sales through various provisions, some of which are admittedly more
effective and equitable than others. 6 Thus, while it is not easy to
formulate restrictions, governing entities can and do preserve
affordability of inclusionary units by restricting sales, leases, assign-
ments and other transfers of units for a given period of time.r
Resale restrictions should be carefully drafted to provide a seller
213. MALLACH, supra note 14, at 147.
214. Rental controls are also important. Otherwise, owners of inclusionary units could
rent their homes for market rent and pocket the profit represented by the difference between
their monthly mortgage payments and market rental. Most programs have some occupancy re-
quirements. There may be exceptions under particular circumstances, but the unit would gen-
erally have to be rented to a qualified party.
215. "Where there is a direct financial contribution to a housing development...
through participation in costs of infrastructure, write down of land costs, or subsidizing the
cost of construction, the city, county, or city and county shall assure continued availability
for low- and moderate-income units for 30 years." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65916 (West 1994);
see also Proposed CA AB 2206, supra note 95.
216. For a discussion of resale controls generally, see supra text accompanying notes 82-
92.
217. Affordability is generally preserved through deed restrictions, covenants, or similar
means. For a discussion of typical resale restrictions, see supra text accompanying notes 84-
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with a fair return while ensuring that the unit remains affordable.
Without resale restrictions, the supply of inclusionary units created
through inclusionary programs would diminish and first generation
sellers would obtain a windfall profit at the expense of other parties.
Another problem with resale restrictions is that during the initial
period after adoption of an inclusionary housing program, the restric-
tions will be accompanied by extra costs and time delays. These arise
in connection with familiarizing parties such as lenders and title com-
panies with resale restrictions, and obtaining their approval of the
restrictions. This is a short term problem that must be dealt with
every time a regulation is enacted which affects title or property
financing.
Inclusionary housing has been criticized because it has the poten-
tial to slow or shut down housing production.21 Some economists
criticize inclusionary housing, especially units for purchase, primarily
because someone must pay if developers are required to sell
inclusionary units at less than market value. Generally, if a developer
sells a unit at market value, the developer will recover "normal"
profits. However, if the developer is required to sell below market,
the developer will make "below normal" profits, possibly break even,
and maybe even lose money. The outcome depends on a number of
factors, including the elasticity of the housing market." 9 This criti-
cism is valid if developers are not offered enough incentives to make
development worthwhile. In other words, if there is little chance of
making an acceptable profit, few for-profit developers will build hous-
ing and the prediction that housing production will be stymied, or
even halted, would likely occur. Thus, it is critical to the success of
an inclusionary housing program that it offer adequate incentives to
218. Bernard Siegan, Commentary on Redistribution of Income Through Regulation in
Housing, 32 EMORY L.J. 721, 721-22 (1983) (Inclusionary zoning, if not accompanied by
compensating bonuses, creates a strong disincentive to development and construction of new
housing.); CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE, STUDY OF LAW STRUCTURES, HOUSING POLICY
IN ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1960-1980 72-73 (Dec. 1982).
[Clurrent housing policies have the net effect of reducing the overall stock of
housing below what it would be without these policies. With respect to
inclusionary housing, specifically, the number of inclusionary units is higher than it
otherwise would be, but the number of non-inclusionary units falls so much that
the total stock of housing is reduced. Over the long run, the stock of housing will
grow about half as fast with inclusionary policy as without.
Id
219. See supra text accompanying notes 182-85; see also Muth, supra note 26, at 708-
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entice a developer to build. 2
Opponents of inclusionary housing argue that it is not cost-effec-
tive and that there are more efficient ways to provide affordable
housing." The thrust of the argument is that the money used to
produce new housing could go a lot further through other programs
or mechanisms such as filtering, rehabilitation, and rent subsidies.
Filtering is not an active housing policy. Rather, it is a process
that may naturally occur when middle- and upper-income households
vacate existing homes and move to new, more expensive homes. This
in turn results in an increased supply of housing for low- and moder-
ate-income families.'
A substantial number of low- and moderate-income families do
obtain housing through the filtering process, without the intervention
of any housing programs. z' Filtering is thus an economical way to
provide affordable housing. Inclusionary housing critics argue that it
should therefore be the housing policy of choice. 24 While filtering
220. For a detailed discussion of who pays for inclusionary housing and the role that
incentives play in determining who pays, see supra notes 168-96 and accompanying text.
221.
New construction is needed to maintain an ample supply of low cost housing;
however, too great a reliance on new construction raises . . . key issues. One is
cost; clearly new construction of privately owned units is very expensive on a per
unit basis, especially since investors seem to demand deep tax subsidies, as well as
direct rent subsidies, as a condition for risking their money on the disadvantaged.
HAYS, supra note 19, at 258. "Therefore, the use of existing standard units to house the poor
is a useful way to spread resources further and to achieve a better mix of families served."
222. Filtering has been succinctly described as follows:
As time passes, the housing units in this neighborhood become older and less
stylish compared to newer units. Housing fashions change swiftly in the United
States-probably faster than anywhere else in the world ...
At the same time, the real incomes of many households initially living in
this neighborhood increase. Many move to even newer housing units that are larg-
er, more stylish, and in "fancier" neighborhoods ...
As more time passes, the once new housing becomes less and less desirable
compared to the newest and best in society, even if it is well maintained. Because
it is occupied by a succession of relatively lower and lower income groups, it
eventually houses groups with absolutely much lower incomes than those who first
lived there. . . . Finally, the housing becomes occupied by the lowest income
groups in society and falls into extreme disrepair.
At that point, this housing has "trickled down" through society's income
distribution- from near the top to the bottom.
DOWNS, supra note 140, at 4-5.
223. Ellickson, supra note 171, at 1185.
224. See id.; see also MALLACH, supra note 14, at 39. While Mallach does not necessar-
ily subscribe to this belief, he summarizes the argument as follows:
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may be an efficient mechanism for providing affordable housing, it
has a few problems. First, it is ineffective where housing demand is
greater than supply because resale home values appreciate, rather than
depreciate, in those markets.' Accordingly, costs for resale homes
may be equal to, or greater than, the cost of new homes.as Second,
the quality of housing at the bottom of the filtering process is fre-
quently sub-standard 27 Thus, even if it is affordable, it is probably
not up to code and may be ripe for demolition. Finally, filtering
perpetuates economic segregation as it lumps people with like-income
together throughout the entire trickling down process.' Economic
integration is a stated goal of housing policy 9 that simply cannot
be met through the filtering process.
Rehabilitating existing housing is another way to solve the af-
fordable housing crisis. Rehabilitation is certainly more efficient than
construction of new housing, and it sometimes makes sense to up-
grade existing housing rather than to build housing from scratch. But
rehabilitation suffers from shortcomings similar to those that plague
filtering. For example, it improves sub-standard housing, but often
just barely. It perpetuates segregation." Finally, because most sub-
standard housing is located in inner cities, rehabilitation is limited to
those areas and does little to improve the affordable housing shortage
in suburban areas. Thus, rehabilitation is one of the solutions that
should be pursued to deal with the shortage of affordable housing. It
alone, however, cannot solve all the problems connected with the
affordable housing crisis.
[Less affluent] households buy or rent older units as they filter down from the
more affluent, and it is therefore more appropriate as well as more economically
efficient to construct new units largely or entirely for the more affluent share of
the market. Furthermore, by interfering with that process, new construction for less
affluent households is not only inefficient, but arguably diminishes housing opportu-
nities for lower-income households by reducing the amount of filtering taking
place.
Id.
225. MALLACH, supra note 14, at 40.
226. Id. at 40-41.
227. Id. at 40.
228. See id. at 42 (pointing out that filtering "reinforces existing discrepancies between
urban and suburban areas and between areas of economic growth and stagnation").
229. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat.
633 (1974) (codified is scattered sections of 12, 15, 20, 42, and 49 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
230. Generally projects in inner city or run down areas, which tend to be segregated, are
targeted for rehabilitation.
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Rent subsidies are also part of the solution to the affordable
housing problem. However, they cannot operate by themselves and
depending on the type of subsidy involved, the subsidy may not
actually be used for housing. For example, some subsidies to renters
are based on a median rental rate in the relevant geographical area,
rather than on an actual rental rate."' With such subsidies, a family
may choose to live in cheap, sub-standard housing and use the differ-
ence between the subsidy and the actual amount paid for housing, for
other living expenses such as food. In that case, the rent subsidy
helps the recipient pay for living expenses, but it does not help place
the recipient in a decent home. As another example, subsidies may
only be available for use in public housing which is generally in
inner cities. While such subsidies do provide housing, they still per-
petuate economic segregation and limit real housing choices. Subsidies
are also used in connection with inclusionary housing, 2 and with-
out them, housing might not be available to occupants of inclusionary
units. In this case, they are an essential component of a solution, but
they are not the entire solution. While subsidies are integral to solv-
ing the affordable housing crisis, they often must be combined with
other programs to be effective. Thus, they should and must remain
part of the strategy to solve the housing problem. But, they are not
by themselves an effective substitute for inclusionary housing.
Some inclusionary housing programs require participation from
all new housing developers, regardless of the size of the contemplated
development. 3 Critics argue that it is inefficient and impractical to
impose such a program on small developments. For example, if a
landowner lives in a city with inclusionary housing that requires
twenty percent of all new development to be set aside for low- and
moderate-income families, and the landowner wants to build a single
house on a lot, it would be impractical to set aside twenty percent of
the house as affordable housing. Most localities handle this by either
excusing small projects, or allowing developers to purchase and sell
credits, to provide off-site affordable housing, or to pay a fee in-lieu
of providing housing.' Prior to drafting an inclusionary housing
231. For a description of this type of rental subsidy program, see HAYS, supra note 19,
at 247-48.
232. See supra text accompanying note 69.
233. See, e.g., Carlsbad, Cal., Ordinance NS-232 (Apr. 20, 1993). However, this does not
require construction of an inclusionary unit if a developer is only building a single unit; in
that case a developer may pay an in-lieu fee. Id. § 21.85.050.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
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program, a locality should perform a feasibility analysis which deter-
mines the minimum number of units which can profitably be devel-
oped under the requirements of the program. 5 The program should
not apply to any projects smaller than the number established in the
study, or it should allow small project developers one of the above
options in-lieu of providing on-site housing. Thus, there are many
ways to avoid this problem altogether or to mitigate the problem.
An additional difficulty related to this last problem arises from
the option of paying a fee in-lieu of producing inclusionary units. In
many high priced communities, developers select this option and do
not produce any on-site units."6 While this still produces significant
funds for affordable housing, it does not necessarily result in the
production of affordable housing,"s7 and even when it does, units are
generally produced inefficiently because most localities and housing
agencies are not in the housing development business." Thus, lo-
calities that include in-lieu options should be careful to include a
mechanism for efficiently converting collected funds into inclusionary
units. For example, they could require that funds be used to rehabili-
tate existing housing; provide funding for non-profit developers to
build affordable housing; or provide funding or additional incentives
for other developers to build inclusionary units in addition to those
which they are required to build.
235. See, e.g., Proposed MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.7(a)(2).
236. For example, as of the time the California Inclusionary Housing Survey was pro-
duced, Coronado and Del Mar had not produced any units under their inclusionary housing
programs, even though their programs had been in place for 7-12 years. As of early 1994,
they had collectively obtained fees in the amount of $1,637,500. Telephone Interview with
Ann McCall, Assistant Planner, Community Development Department of the City of
Coronado, and Steve Power, Associate Planner, PlanninglCommunity Development Department
of the City of Del Mar. While it has not built new units with its funds, Coronado has used
most of its in-lieu fees to rehabilitate SRO's (single resident occupancy) and for rental assis-
tance subsidies. Del Mar uses its funds primarily to rehabilitate older units. Although these
forms of assistance certainly help ameliorate the affordable housing crisis, they technically do
not follow the letter of inclusionary housing programs because they do not produce new units
which are dispersed throughout new developments. Id.
237. Id.
238. MALLACH, supra note 14, at 176. One building association executive commented
that:
[i]n Ventura and other places where this approach [inclusionary zoning] was tak-
en. . . . most developers simply paid a fee in lieu of constructing such units.
Local agencies then found themselves in the building business and were unsuccess-
ful in cutting costs substantially. "Research showed that inclusionary zoning pro-
duced very few inclusionary units."
Roger M. Showley, Building Group's New Chief to Push Affordable Housing, SAN DIEGO
UNON-TRm., Feb. 16, 1992, at F29.
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There are a number of criticisms of inclusionary housing, many
of them valid. However, several of the criticisms can be resolved
through the mechanics of a program and public education regarding
the need for affordable housing and the benefits of dispersed afford-
able housing. 9 If they cannot be so resolved, even recognizing
their validity, the problems still do not outweigh the benefits of
inclusionary housing.
V. LEGAL CHALLENGES: TAKINGS, DUE PROCESS, EQUAL
PROTECTION, AND RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION
This part analyzes legal challenges on the grounds that
inclusionary housing programs constitute takings, violate substantive
due process and equal protection, and impose invalid restraints on
alienation. The analysis is necessary in order to determine the legal
validity of inclusionary housing generally, and the Proposed MIHO
specifically. Since many of the relevant legal tests require a fact
specific inquiry, it is difficult to conclude authoritatively that all
inclusionary housing programs would survive all legal challenges.
However, any program, including the Proposed MIHO, would be
upheld so long as it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
purpose; is not arbitrary or capricious; does not cause a property
owner to suffer a total economic loss; does not unfairly discriminate
against a particular party; and provides incentives sufficient to allow
the average developer to earn a reasonable profit.
A. Takings
This section focuses on takings jurisprudence and analyzes
whether key provisions common to inclusionary housing programs
could withstand takings challenges. The Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution prohibits the taking of private property
without just compensation.' The Fifth Amendment applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.24' Most state constitutions
also prohibit local and state governments from taking private property
without just compensation.'a Thus, both federal and state constitu-
239. See NIMBY REPORT, supra note 21, at 8-1.
240. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation.").
241. U.S. CONST. amend. Xmv.
242. See, e.g., the California Constitution, which provides that "[private property may be
taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation . . . has irst been paid." CAL.
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tions limit governmental power to take private property for public
use.
Land use regulations are sometimes deemed regulatory takings.
Regulatory takings tests used over the last century have been fluid,
changing with the composition of courts and reflecting current social,
economic, and jurisprudential values and norms. The main issue that
arises under the Proposed MIHO and most inclusionary housing pro-
grams is whether requiring developers to provide housing for very
low-, low-, and moderate-income households, which requirement may
not only deprive developers of a profit, but actually cause them to
lose money, is a regulatory taking. I conclude that this type of provi-
sion would probably be upheld so long as the particular challenged
program provided adequate incentives to allow a developer to earn
reasonable profits. Since there is no singular takings test, in order to
analyze the issues appropriately, keeping in mind the current legal
temperament, it is important to trace the development of takings juris-
prudence.
1. General History of Takings Jurisprudence
Takings are generally divided into physical and regulatory classi-
fications. Physical takings are much easier to analyze. If property is
physically appropriated, there is clearly a taking and the government
will usually be required to compensate the private property owner.243
Thus, physical invasions of private property, whether permanent or
temporary, 2" and without regard to the physical quantity of property
CONST. art. I, § 19.
243. With respect to physical invasions of property, "[ijn general (at least with regard to
permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the
public purpose behind it, we have required compensation." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct 2886, 2893 (1992); see also Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84
(1962) (holding that government had engaged in a taking by appropriating an air easement
over plaintiff's home so that flights could land and take off safely); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946) (same).
244. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
the Court addressed the issue of compensation for temporary takings occurring prior to the
ultimate invalidation of a challenged regulation. 482 U.S. 304, 313 (1987). Even though the
challenged regulation in this case was designed to protect public health and safety (it prevent-
ed construction of a summer camp for handicapped persons in a flood zone), the Court or-
dered compensation because the regulation denied the property owners of all economically
viable use while the regulation was in effect. Id. at 321. While this case dealt with a theoret-
ically regulatory taking, a taking which denies a property owner all economically viable use
of land may be considered a permanent taking because the owner has no right to use the
property. Id. at 318; see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (ordering
government to compensate in light of finding of regulatory taking). But see PruneYard Shop-
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invaded,' s are generally compensable takings. This is true regardless
of whether the physical invasion renders the value of property worth-
less, even if the taking achieves an important public benefit.246
The law governing regulatory takings is much more obfuscated.
The courts have not established a bright-line test for determining
whether a regulation constitutes a compensable taking. The Supreme
Court has stated that it "quite simply, has been unable to develop any
'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a
few persons."'247 However, in most regulatory takings cases, courts
attempt to strike an equitable balance between the legitimate use of
state police power for the health, safety, welfare and morals of its
residents (the "public interest"), and a party's private property interest
(the "private interest").248
Legal challenges to takings are either "facial" or "as-applied."249
A facial challenge would allege that the mere enactment of a regula-
tion constitutes a taking; an as-applied challenge would allege specific
injury or losses resulting from the enforcement of a regulation."sa A
facial challenge is evaluated by using the "no economically viable
use" test," while an as-applied challenge is more likely to apply
the "Penn CentraF" test. 2 The Proposed MIHO itself would likely
ping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
245. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 438 n.16
(1982). The challenged statute, which allowed cable companies to install equipment in apart-
ment buildings, was held to be a compensable taking because it permanently deprived build-
ing owners of the use of a portion of their property. Id. "We affirm the traditional rule that
a permanent physical occupation of property is a taking. In such a case, the property owner
entertains a historically rooted expectation of compensation, and the character of the invasion
is qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other category of property regulation." Id. at
441.
246. See generally Loretto, 458 U.S. 419; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
247. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citations
omitted).
248. See, e.g., Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668-69.
249. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 494, n.23 (1987)
(quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707, 710, n.3 (1985)).
250. Id. at 494-95.
251. See id. at 495. "The test to be applied in considering this facial challenge is fairly
straightforward. A statute regulating the uses that can be made of property effects a taking if
it 'denies an owner economically viable use of his land."' Id. (citations omitted).
252. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981).
For a description of the Penn Central test, see infra note 267 and accompanying text; see
also DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 485-502 (utilizing the Penn Central factors). See generally
Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I-A Cri-
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confront a facial challenge, whereas a specific developer who has
commenced a project would likely raise an as-applied challenge to
thwart any attempts to enforce the law against him.
The tests employed over time to determine how much weight
should be accorded each of the public and private interests, and what
circumstances should cause the scale to tip one way or the other, are
significant enough to warrant some discussion.
Two early Supreme Court cases, Mugler v. Kansas 3 and
Hadacheck v. Sebastian,'4 best illustrate the Court's initial approach
to deciding takings cases. In each case, the Court differentiated be-
tween non-compensable regulations enacted pursuant to validly exer-
cised police power, and compensable regulatory takings. 5 In the
late 1800s, if regulations' purposes or effects were to protect the
public from harm, then the Court did not balance the public and
private interests, upholding the regulations without compensation to a
private property owner. 6 The rationale was that the state is respon-
sible for protecting public health, safety, and morals and that laws de-
signed to promote these interests were seen as legitimate mechanisms
to prevent landowners from creating nuisances, rather than encroach-
ing upon private property rights.7 Regulations intended to exact
public benefits were likewise upheld in both of these cases, but the
government was required to compensate a private property owner."
In a 1922 landmark decision, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 9 the Supreme Court held that a state act prohibiting subsi-
dence coal mining constituted a compensable taking." ° The Court
determined that the Kohler Act"s made it commercially impracti-
cable for plaintiff to mine certain coal."s2 Even though the purpose
tique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1316-34 (1989).
253. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The Mugler Court held that a ban on the production and sale
of alcohol was noncompensable. See id. at 671.
254. 239 U.S. 394 (1915). The Hadacheck Court confirmed that a zoning ordinance
which resulted in the prohibition of a brickyard operation in a residential area was noncom-
pensable. See id. at 412-14.
255. See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 409-12; Mugler, 123 U.S. at 657-59, 667-69.
256. Hadacheck, 293 U.S. at 410-11; Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
257. Hadacheck, 293 U.S. at 410-11; Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
258. Hadacheck, 293 U.S. at 409; Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
259. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
260. Id. at 414.
261. Act of Pennsylvania, P.L. 1198 (May 27, 1921) (the "Kohler Act").
262. The Kohler Act effectively prohibited the plaintiff coal company from mining under
a single private residence where such mining could collapse the residence. Pennsylvania Coal,
260 U.S. at 412-13. Prior to enactment of the Kohler Act, the residence owner purchased the
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of the Kohler Act was to protect homeowners from the harm caused
by mining that would undermine their houses' foundations and lead to
collapse, the Court held that a complete diminution in the economic
value of plaintiff's private property interest required compensation.'
By so deciding, the Court balanced the Kohler Act's prevention of
harm (the public interest), against the costs borne by a property own-
er (the private interest). On one side of the scale, the Court looked at
the regulation's financial impact on the private interest and deter-
mined that regulatory action could not deprive a property owner of
all economic property use.2 This concept of property's economic
value to the private interest has been incorporated into takings analy-
sis as one factor used in assessing whether a regulation requires com-
pensation.
Pennsylvania Coal established a noted shift in the focus of tak-
ings analysis from total reliance on the character of a regulation, to a
balance between the public and private interests. This pragmatic ap-
proach was inevitable as there is no clear line between a regulation
which prevents public harm and one which grants a public benefit.
Almost any regulation can be characterized as having both attributes.
In 1978, the Court revisited the economic loss issue in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.' Here, New York
City designated Grand Central Station as an historic landmark, prohib-
iting plaintiff from constructing a multi-story building in the airspace
above its private property.2" Plaintiff challenged the designation as
a taking. The Court examined "the economic impact of the regula-
tion," the extent to which the regulation interfered with plaintiff's
investment-backed expectations, and "the character" of the regula-
tion. 7
With respect to the first factor, the Court found that in relation
to the plaintiff's entire bundle of property rights, the diminution in
property value resulting from the regulation was by itself, inadequate
surface of the property, granting plaintiff the right to remove all the underlying coal, and
waiving all claims for damages arising from coal mining. Id. at 412.
263. Id. at 414-15.
264. Id. at 414.
265. 438 U.S. 104 (1978)..
266. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1977); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
109-15 & n.5.
267. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, 130-31. "The economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations." Id. at 124. See gener-
ally Peterson, supra note 251, at 1317-27.
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to find a taking." As to the next factor, even though the chal-
lenged regulation interfered with the plaintiffs investment-backed
expectations, the Court held that, so long as the plaintiff could earn a
reasonable return, there was no compensable taking.269 It did find,
however, that the more a regulation interferes with investment-backed
expectations, the more the scales will weigh in favor of the private
interest.270 The Penn Central Court did not award compensation,
emphasizing the plaintiff's ability to retain a reasonable investment re-
turn.27
Regarding the final factor, the Court held that "[t]he restrictions
imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the general
welfare."'272 Accordingly, the legitimacy of an act is evaluated based
on "the government's justification for its action."'273 Unfortunately,
the Court specifically declined to provide a formula for weighing and
balancing the factors.'
In Agins v. City of Tiburon,2" the Court articulated a two-
prong test to determine whether a regulation required compensa-
tion.276 First, the Court inquired whether government action ad-
vanced a legitimate state interest.277 Second, it considered whether
government action denied landowners "economically viable use" of
their property."
Under the Agins test, a court will find a compensable taking if a
government regulation either fails to "advance [a] legitimate state
268. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31; see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497-99 (1987) (further defining the bundle-stick analysis).
269. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136-38.
270. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
271. Id. at 136.
272. Id. at 138 (finding that the regulation's purpose of preserving buildings or areas
with special historical, architectural, or cultural significance was a valid exercise of authority).
One could, however, make a very strong argument that the designation came closer to exact-
ing a public benefit than preventing a public harm. In fact, the dissent argued that the pur-
pose of the legislation was to preserve art and not to prohibit a public nuisance, thereby
rendering it a compensable taking. See id. at 144-46 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Berger, CJ.
and Stevens, J., dissenting).
273. Peterson, supra note 251, at 1318-19.
274. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. For a discussion of the Penn Central test generally,
see Peterson, supra note 252, At 1317-27.
275. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The challenged regulation was a zoning restriction which
limited plaintiffs' ability to develop their property, allowing them to develop a maximum of
five single family residences on a five acre parcel. Id. at 257.
276. Id. at 260; see also Peterson, supra note 252, at 1327-30.
277. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
278. Id.
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interest or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." '279
Under the first prong, the Court held that the city's police power
could be used to enact the challenged regulation, reasoning that "[t]he
zoning ordinances benefit the appellants as well as the public by
serving the city's interest in assuring careful and orderly development
of residential property with provision for open-space areas."28 Un-
der the second prong, the Court held that appellants were not denied
all economically viable use of their land because they still had a right
to build up to five houses on their property."8 "At this juncture, the
appellants are free to pursue their reasonable investment expectations
by submitting a development plan to local officials." 2"
In 1987, the Court decided two land use cases that further cloud-
ed the already murky water of takings jurisprudence. 3 In Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,2 4 the Court looked first at
the character of the challenged regulation." The Court held that the
challenged statute furthered legitimate state interests in protecting,
among other things, the state's health and environment.286 The Court
denied compensation even though the regulation destroyed the
property's value, reasoning that "[c]ourts have consistently held that a
State need not provide compensation when it diminishes or destroys
the value of property by stopping illegal activity or abating a public
nuisance."'
The Court also looked at the "investment-backed expectations"
factor, finding that the scale here similarly weighed in favor of the
279. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
280. Id. at 262.
281. Id. at 262-63.
282. Id. at 262.
283. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
284. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
285. Id. at 485-93. Like Pennsylvania Coal, coal operators in this case challenged a
statute which prohibited coal mining that caused a potential for collapse of above ground
structures. Id. at 474 (citing Pennsylvania Subsidence Act, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 52, § 1406.4
(1966 & Supp. 1994)).
286. Id. at 488. The Court distinguished the Kohler Act which did not substantially ad-
vance a legitimate state interest, because the Kohler Act advanced the rights of individuals
(by protecting private parties who specifically waived and released their right to support). IM.
at 485-88. The challenged act in this case, on the other hand, "protect[ed] the public interest
in health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area," id. at 488, thus passing mus-
ter under the character of the regulation test. Id. at 488-92. See Peterson, supra note 252, at
1329-30.
287. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 492 n.22 (citations omitted).
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public interest."5 It relied on the fact that the plaintiff coal opera-
tors did not allege that the statute rendered their operations unprofit-
able. 9 The Court distinguished Pennsylvania Coal, implying that,
even if the plaintiffs had alleged that they were denied all economi-
cally viable use of their land, the statute would still be upheld.2'
Analyzing the economic impact factor, the Court looked at the
plaintiffs' total property interest.29 1 It held that an entire parcel must
be rendered useless, not merely a strand in the bundle of property
rights.292 Significantly, Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion
in which Justices Powell (who is no longer on the Court), O'Connor,
and Scalia joined, arguing that property segmentation can be utilized
to determine whether a taking has occurred.293 With a differently
composed Supreme Court-such as today's Court--this case may
well have turned out differently.
The Court has occasionally required compensation when a chal-
lenged regulation interferes with "essential property rights," regardless
of the value maintained by a landowner.295 In such instances, the
balance between public and private interests favors the private. For
example, in Nollan, the Court held that a regulation requiring uncom-
pensated conveyance of an easement across plaintiffs beach front
property violated the Fifth Amendment, even though plaintiff retained
considerable value.296 It reasoned that the state's attempt to acquire
the easement was invalid because no sufficient nexus could be estab-
lished between the condition imposed and plaintiffs request to
build.297 Thus, the Nollan Court expanded the first prong of Agins
by requiring a nexus between a land use regulation enacted under the
288. Id. at 493.
289. Id.
290. "In this case, by contrast [to Pennsylvania Coal], petitioners have not shown any
deprivation significant enough to satisfy the heavy burden placed upon one alleging a regula-
tory taking:' Id.
291. Id. at 497-98 (Plaintiffs argued that they lost all value as to one strand, that is, the
coal which they could not mine.).
292. Id. at 498-99.
293. Id. at 515-20.
294. Since 1987, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and White (who joined the ma-
jority opinion), as well as Powell (who joined the dissent), have departed from the Court.
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer have joined the Court.
295. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
296. Id. at 841-42. The easement was required as a condition to approval of a building
permit for a home on the property. IME at 828.
297. Id. at 836-37.
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police power and the social harm it is designed to alleviate.298
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,29 did little to clarify
this area of the law. In Lucas, the Court looked at whether a land-
owner must be compensated if a state bars all construction on that
land to protect the public interest. °° It held that a regulation is a
compensable taking if it denies a landowner all economically viable
land use, subject to some exceptions.0
The Lucas decision in effect blended the Agins two-prong test
into one analysis. The threshold inquiry is whether a regulation denies
all economically viable land use.3°2 If it does, the owner must be
compensated unless the regulation is based upon antecedent common
law property and nuisance principles.3 °3 If some value remains, then
the inquiry is converted to a balancing between the public and private
interests.3" A difficult issue here is what if there is some economi-
cally viable use, i.e., at what point in the continuum between maxi-
mum economic value and no economic value is a property owner
compensated?
35
298. Id. at 837.
299. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
300. Id. at 2889. The regulation was designed to protect coastal property. Id.
301. Id. at 2901-02. The exceptions arise if a regulation is based on existing, identifiable
"background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses [plaintiff] now
intends in the circumstances in which the property is presently found." Id. On remand, the
state court determined that no exceptions applied. Therefore, the state owed Lucas compensa-
tion based on a total and temporary deprivation of land use. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (S.C. 1992) (holding additionally that Lucas could still seek a
special permit to construct a dwelling, and it was thus premature to order damages for per-
manent deprivation).
302. "Property is generally deprived of all economically beneficial use where construction
is banned entirely, such as when the property is required to remain as open space." Ehrlich
v. Culver City, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 475 (Ct. App. 1993) (in reliance on Lucas).
303. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02.
304.
The "total taking" inquiry we require today will ordinarily entail (as the
application of state nuisance law ordinarily entails) analysis of, among other things,
the degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private property,
posed by the claimant's proposed activities, . . .the social value of the claimant's
activities and their suitability to the locality in question, . . . and the relative ease
with which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by the claim-
ant and the government (or adjacent private landowners) alike.
Id. at 2901 (citations omitted).
305. Justice Stevens' dissent in Lucas criticized the majority test because it was too
arbitrary and resulted in the problem illustrated by the above question. Id. at 2919. "A land-
owner whose property is diminished in value 95% recovers nothing, while an owner whose
property is diminished 100% recovers the land's full value." Id. The majority responded by
stating that:
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It is clear by now that takings jurisprudence has been inconsis-
tent at best. The emphasis evolved from a public benefit analysis to
an economic analysis, with each tempered by an effort to strike a fair
balance between the public and private interests.
2. Do Inclusionary Housing Provisions Constitute Takings?
Developers would most likely challenge the provisions in the
Proposed MIHO, or in any inclusionary housing program for that
matter, which require them to produce a specified percentage of units
for very low-, low-, and moderate-income households." The chal-
lenge would be based on the rationale that such requirements would
cause developers to lose money. In spite of the muddled state of
takings jurisprudence, based on historical takings law, modem trends,
and the current composition of the Court, I predict that these types of
This analysis errs in its assumption that the landowner whose deprivation is one
step short of complete is not entitled to compensation. Such an owner might not
be able to claim the benefit of our categorical formulation, but, as we have ac-
knowledged time and again, "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claim-
ant and . . . the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations" are keenly relevant to takings analysis generally. . . . It
is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will get nothing
while the landowner with total loss will recover in full. But that occasional result
is no more strange than the gross disparity between the landowner whose premises
are taken for a highway (who recovers in full) and the landowner whose property
is reduced to 5% of its former value by the highway (who recovers nothing).
Takings law is full of these "all-or-nothing" situations.
Id. at 2895 n.8 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Thus, the majority indicated that
loss of a substantial portion of property short of a 100% loss is a rare case. Id In fact, it is
probably rare that people lose 100% of property use and much more likely that they lose a
substantial portion of their property. As no categorical rule is available at such point, we
resort to the balancing test between public and private interests with the usual reference to
relevant factors.
The most recent landmark regulatory takings case, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 1994 WL
276693 (U.S. June 24, 1994), established a new wrinkle to the Nollan test. Recall that under
Nollan, there must be a nexus between a land use regulation or condition and a social harm
that the condition is intended to ameliorate. Dolan, 1994 WL 276693, at *5-6. In Dolan, the
City of Tigard conditioned issuance of a building permit on the applicant's dedication of a
portion of her property to the city in order to alleviate harm which the building project
might cause. Id. at *3. The Supreme Court held that if the condition was not "roughly pro-
portional" to the harm that the condition was designed to offset, then the applicant should be
compensated for any loss caused by complying with the condition. Id. at *8.
Thus, Dolan modified the Nollan test by requiring courts to determine not only
whether an essential nexus exists between a legitimate state interest and a condition to devel-
opment. In addition, if such a nexus exists, courts must also decide whether there is a rough-
ly proportional "connection between the exactions and the projected impact on the proposed
development." Id. at *5.
306. See, e.g., Proposed MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.7(a)(2)(A).
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
provisions would survive a takings challenge.
The takings test to be applied to a challenge of this nature
would depend on a number of factors. Due to the uncertainty in this
area, it is prudent to analyze a takings challenge to inclusionary hous-
ing considering components of all the takings tests.
It is unlikely that a court would make a ruling based solely upon
the "character of the regulation" test, but it is still a factor which a
court would consider. Provisions requiring an affordable housing set-
aside could be enacted pursuant to the police power on the grounds
that states (and by extension cities and counties) are responsible for
the health, safety, and welfare of their residents. Since the provision
of housing, especially sorely needed affordable housing, is unquestion-
ably related to that power, the enactment of these provisions would
be in the purview of a state or local government's police power."
A court would also look at whether set-aside provisions cause an
impacted party to suffer severe financial hardship.3 This requires
balancing a regulation's prevention of harm or grant of public bene-
fits against the regulation's economic impact. Set-aside provisions
clearly do not prevent nuisance-like activity, but they certainly grant a
public benefit by providing affordable housing." Against this bene-
fit, a court weighs the financial impact on a private party. ° This is
hard to measure in the abstract without knowing the specific details
of an ordinance and the actual financial impact on a development
project.3 ' If a developer could have earned reasonable profits by
taking advantage of all available incentives, a court would expect the
developer to do so and would still find the scales tipping in favor of
the public interest. A trickier question arises when a developer has
taken advantage of all incentives and still merely breaks even or
actually loses money. If there is some viable economic use of the
307. See Lawrence Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U. L. RBV.
165 (1974) (noting that land use has continually been regulated by zoning and other "police
power devices").
308. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
309. Note that under Mugler, if a regulation only granted a public benefit without pre-
venting harm, it would be a compensable taking. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661
(1887).
310. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 307, at 175-76 (asserting that if all or substantially all
of the value of the property is destroyed as a result of the government act, compensation
must be paid).
311. The DeBenedictis Court implied that facial challenges generally will not be success-
ful given the need for a factual context in takings cases. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495-97 (1987).
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land, a court would uphold the regulation. However, if land is zoned
only for residential use and any developer would lose money by
complying with set-aside provisions, a court might invalidate the
regulation.'32
Under Penn Central, a court would also look at a regulation's
economic impact."3 This requires a court to first define the regulat-
ed property interest. Most courts will look at the entire bundle of
rights, not merely one stick in the bundle.3t4 If the private interest
earns a reasonable rate of return on its entire bundle of property
rights, this factor will weigh in favor of the public interest.1 5 How-
ever, if the private interest cannot earn reasonable profits, this factor
will weigh in favor of the private interest. Nonetheless, if the private
property owner can make some other land use which would produce
a reasonable rate of return, this factor would weigh in favor of the
public interest."6 Depending on how the other factors tip the scale,
compensation could be ordered.
According to Penn Central, a court would also analyze a
regulation's interference with investment-backed expectations. This
factor is difficult to measure. How do you determine a party's reason-
able, investment-backed expectations? Expectations may be reasonable
if in accord with existing law when the expectations were developed.
Timing is also significant-was the regulation enacted before or after
312. A court could not modify the regulation but in a decision invalidating the regula-
tion, it could provide suggested modifications so that it would pass constitutional muster.
Note that a court would not order compensation to a private party in a facial challenge be-
cause it would be very difficult to measure damages prior to actual development. If an as-
applied challenge arose following development and a court determined that in order to com-
ply with the regulation, a developer would at best break even and otherwise lose money, it
would probably find that the private party should be compensated.
313. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
314. See, e.g., DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. at 497. For example, if a developer owns 100
acres and is proposing a three phase development, one phase of which will contain most of
the below market rate units, one phase which includes no such units, and one phase which
contains some below market units, a court will look at the entire development rather than
segmenting it into discrete phases.
315. So if a developer still earns reasonable profits in complying with set-aside require-
ments, the challenged provision would be upheld.
316. A mere diminution in value is inadequate in and of itself to prove that a regulation
constitutes a taking. Normally, a regulation must deny the private interest all economically
viable land use. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-63 (1980). It is un-
likely that any inclusionary housing program would deny an owner or developer all economi-
cally viable land use. With the incentives offered in most programs, a developer should be
able to profitably build a residential development. Furthermore, an owner or developer may
make alternate land uses or can sell raw land.
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a developer purchased land and made development plans? Were there
public hearings concerning inclusionary housing regulations before
development plans were underway? Did the developer spend a sub-
stantial amount of time and money in pre-development activities prior
to enactment of the regulations?
If a developer was aware of set-aside requirements but continued
developing anyway, then the developer's investment-backed expec-
tations would have been shaped by that information and this factor
would weigh in favor of the public interest.317 If, however, a devel-
oper was already well underway in development plans when a chal-
lenged regulation was first proposed and later enacted, the developer's
investment-backed expectations would probably anticipate profitability.
In that case, this factor would weigh in favor of the private inter-
est? 8 Residential developers are probably aware of the Proposed
MIO,3 9 including its set-aside requirements, and it is a matter of
public record that a statewide inclusionary housing program is being
considered. If the Proposed MIHO is enacted, all California develop-
ers will thereafter be on notice and their investment-backed expecta-
tions will be formed accordingly.32 Existing landowners who be-
come subject to inclusionary housing mid-project may have a stronger
argument that the requirement interferes with their reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations." The ultimate resolution depends on the
317. For example, in Ehrlich v. Culver City, the developer purchased property aware of
regulations restricting the property's use. 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 475 (Ct. App. 1993). The
court denied the developer's takings claim, in part because "[t]he land-use restrictions on the
property coincided with the developer's reasonable investment-backed expectations." Id.; see
Berger, supra note 307, at 223-24.
If at the time of a detrimental act an owner of land knows or should know
of plans for a government project and such a project is later completed, the gov-
ernment activity cannot constitute a taking of his property no matter how adversely
it is affected thereby unless his land is physically invaded by the project.
Id.; see also William I. Gulliford III, Note, The Effect of Notice of Land Use Regulations
Upon Investment-Backed Expectations and Takings Challenges, 23 STErSON L. REv. 201, 215
(1993) ("[A] landowner who was deprived of all economically viable use of property through
the operation of an existing regulation could not claim a compensable taking since such use
had been prohibited when the landowner obtained title to the property.").
318. Gulliford, supra note 317, at 215 ("In such an instance, the burden on the individu-
al landowner is so great and unforeseeable that it 'should be borne by the public as a
whole."') (citations omitted); cf. Berger, supra note 307, at 174, 196.
319. See supra note 14.
320. Investment-backed expectations must at least be reasonable, and thus consistent with
the law. "Consequently, a property owner's expectations are not protected when the property
owner is on notice that an existing government regulation may limit expectations in the use
and enjoyment of the property:' Gulliford, supra note 317, at 219.
321. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-28.
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fact specific inquiry that would accompany an as-applied challenge.
Under Agins, a court would look at whether a regulation furthers
a legitimate state interest." The provision of housing for every in-
come group is certainly within the scope of the police power,"23 and
California cities and counties in fact must provide housing plans for
all income groups.324 It thus follows that set-aside requirements
which would effectuate the legitimate state interest of providing af-
fordable housing, would be upheld.
Nollan requires a nexus between a legitimate state interest'
and a challenged regulation. A nexus exists between the legitimate
state interest of providing affordable housing and a regulation which
requires, as a condition to development, that developers set-aside a
percentage of their units as affordable housing. Nonetheless, it would
be appropriate to compensate out of pocket losses (but not lost prof-
its) resulting from set-aside requirements if they further a legitimate
public interest, but there is no nexus between the requirement and the
actions of the group impacted by the requirement. The rationale is
that the need for the benefit is not caused by the developer's actions.
If the need for the public benefit is caused by the developer's actions
(i.e., new development draws new people of all classes, including
lower income people, who will need affordable housing), then there is
a direct nexus and the developer should internalize the losses.326
322. See supra notes 275-82 and accompanying text.
323. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
324. Id.
325. As already noted, there is a legitimate state interest in providing housing for all of
a state's residents. See supra notes 323-24 and accompanying text.
326. It is questionable whether development of residential housing creates a need for
affordable housing. MALLACH, supra note 14, at 169. There is a much stronger argument that
commercial development is more likely to create such a need because the job base would
create a need for affordable housing. In Commercial Builders of N. California v. Sacramento,
941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), the court looked at the constitutionality of an ordinance which
conditioned commercial development on the payment of fees to be used for low-income hous-
ing (low-income workers would be attracted as the result of such development). The court
held that there was no taking because the ordinance:
was enacted after a careful study revealed the amount of low-income housing that
would likely become necessary as a direct result of the influx of workers that
would be associated with the new nonresidential development . . . The burden
assessed against the developers thus bears a rational relationship to a public cost
closely associated with such development.
Id. at 874. Thus, the court upheld a low- income housing fee because there was a nexus
between commercial development, a legitimate public interest, and the regulation. It also
stated that "Nollan holds that where there is no evidence of a nexus between the develop-
ment and the problem that the exaction seeks to address, the exaction cannot be upheld." Id.
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This issue can be avoided altogether if set-aside requirements are
countered with incentives, which if taken advantage of, would be
adequate to allow developers to earn reasonable profits.327
Under Lucas, a court would look initially at whether a regulation
deprives property owners of all economically viable land use.328 If
no economic value remains, the owner must be compensated unless
the regulation is based on antecedent common law property and nui-
sance principles.329 It is unlikely that set-aside requirements would
deprive developers of all economic value of their land. They may,
however, cause a diminution in value. As such, they would still sur-
vive the less stringent Lucas test.
330
In addition to the tests culled from significant takings cases, it is
important to note general trends and policies that may affect the
outcome under a developer's takings challenge to set-aside require-
ments. A recent trend in takings cases subordinates important public
interests to private property interests, thus giving greater weight to the
private interest side of the scale as evidenced by Nollan, Lucas and
Dolan. The public interest served by a regulation may be secondary
to the private interest, particularly if economic use is diminished, cou-
pled with disappointment of reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions. This is a fair result as it has been conceded that the takings
clause was originally developed to prevent
the public from loading upon one individual more than his just
share of the burdens of government, and says that when he surren-
ders to the public something more and different from that which is
at 875. Accordingly, so long as there is some evidence of a nexus, the regulation would be
upheld.
327. For examples of common incentives, see supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
328. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893-94 (1992).
329. Id. at 2901-02.
330. Finally, under Dolan, once a court finds the requisite Nollan nexus, it still has to
determine that there is a rough proportionality between the required condition and the pro-
posed development. Dolan, 1994 WL 276693, at *8 (U.S. June 24, 1994). While Dolan dealt
with environmental harm, an analogous question that may arise under inclusionary housing is
whether set-aside requirements are roughly proportional to the impact on a city or county
having less land available overall for housing as a result of proposed development. Cities and
counties should be able to argue that if there is an affordable housing shortage (which is true
in most California cities and counties), construction of additional housing would intensify the
problem if affordable housing was not provided for in the construction plans. Accordingly,
the condition that some housing be available to low- or moderate-income persons would be
roughly proportional to the affordable housing crisis. (Of course, the actual set-aside require-
ments would have to be reasonable under the circumstances, otherwise the "rough proportion-
ality" requirement is not met.)
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exacted from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent
shall be returned to him.3'
In summary, takings analysis has shifted from the earliest case
law which broadly construed state police power in upholding regula-
tions for the public good,332 to a greater emphasis on preserving
economic viability, 333 including greater Court willingness to expand
private property rights and review land use regulations with greater
scrutiny.3 4 For the reasons set forth above, a court would not inval-
idate set-aside requirements under a facial challenge so long as an
inclusionary housing program specified the purpose of the regulation,
how that purpose related to a legitimate state interest, and how it
contained adequate incentives to allow a developer to earn reasonable
profits. However, in an as-applied challenge, a court should order
compensation if a developer did not contribute to the need for the
ordinance and could not comply with the ordinance without losing
money.
3. Rent Control
Apartment owners or inclusionary unit owners might challenge
rent control restrictions within inclusionary housing programs on the
ground that they are takings. The rationale would be that restricting
maximum rental income, rather than allowing costs and the market to
determine rental rates, constitutes a taking.
In Pennell v. City of San Jose,33 the Court reviewed a chal-
lenged rent control ordinance. In upholding the ordinance, the Court
held that even if it caused a diminution in property value, "[s]tates
have broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the
331. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893).
332. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887).
333. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
334. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 1994 WL
276693 (U.S. June 24, 1994).
335. 485 U.S. 1 (1988). In this case, a landlord and apartment owners association chal-
lenged a rent control ordinance which allowed automatic annual rent increases of up to eight
percent. Id. at 4-5. A landlord could raise rents by more than eight percent, but if a tenant
objected to such an increase, a hearing would be scheduled. Id. at 5. Hearing officers would
then determine whether the challenged increase was reasonable under the circumstances based
on specific factors, including the hardship to the tenant. Id. The challenge was based on
takings, due process, and equal protection grounds. Id. at 8-9, 11.
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landlord-tenant relationship in particular without paying compensation
for all economic injuries that such regulation entails." '336 Further-
more, the Court held that it was premature to consider a facial tak-
ings challenge, and would only consider an as-applied challenge.337
Thus, pursuant to Pennell, a rent control takings challenge would only
be heard on an as-applied basis.
Rent control restrictions in inclusionary programs can be
analogized to similar restrictions in the mobile home context. In Yee
v. City of Escondido,335 mobile home park owners claimed that local
rent control laws constituted a physical taking insofar as they trans-
ferred an economic right from park owners to mobile home own-
ers.339 The Court ruled only on the physical takings issue, even
though the regulatory taking issue was ripe for adjudication." How-
ever, in discussing regulatory takings generally, it stated that:
compensation is required only if considerations such as the purpose
of the regulation or ihe extent to which it deprives the owner of the
economic use of the property suggest that the regulation has unfairly
singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be
borne by the public as a whole.42
Under dicta in Yee, if a rent control regulation is based on a ques-
tionable purpose or unfairly singles out a particular property owner or
336. Id. at 12 n.6 (quoting with approval Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982) (citations omitted)).
337. Id. at 9-10. It stressed that in takings challenges, the validity of a challenged regu-
lation should only be decided in the context of an actual factual setting. Id.
338. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
339. Id. at 1527-28. While state laws generally regulate mobile home parks, they do not
limit rents. See, e.g., CAL. Ctv. CODE §§ 798-799.79 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995). In this
case, the challenged local ordinance which was approved in 1988, set rents back to their
1986 rates and only allowed rent increases with the City Council's approval. Yee, 112 S. Ct.
at 1527. Plaintiffs argued that a mobile home's value was enhanced by both state laws which
gave the home owner the right to occupy the pad indefinitely, and local laws which granted
protection via rent controls. Id. at 1528. In other words, a mobile home owner could leave
the home at the park indefinitely at controlled rents. This is a valuable right for mobile
home owners because purchasers will pay a premium for homes in parks subject to rent
control. Home owners thus may benefit, but a park owner cannot profit. See id.
340. The Court held that the ordinance did not amount to a physical taking because it
did not authorize an unwanted physical occupation-plaintiffs voluntarily rented pads to mo-
bile home occupants. Id. at 1528.
341. Id. at 1531-34. The regulatory issue was not included in the petition for certiorari,
Id. at 1533. "[Wlere we to address the issue here, we would apparently be the first court in
the nation to determine whether an ordinance like this one effects a regulatory taking." Id. at
1534.
342. Id. at 1526 (dictum) (citations omitted).
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a particular class of property owners, the regulation might be deemed
a taking.
The rent control restrictions in the Proposed MIHO were de-
signed to preserve affordability, 3 a recognized valid purpose.' In
Casella, the court determined that the purpose of a challenged mobile
home rent control. ordinance was "to control excessive rental prices
for the largely fixed-income residents of mobile home parks."' 4 It
held that such purpose was a legitimate interest that could be effectu-
ated through the state's police powers.' " Since the rent control ordi-
nance was reasonably related to the promotion of a valid state inter-
est, the court granted deference to the legislature and upheld the
ordinance.' "  By extension, rent control restrictions in the
inclusionary housing context are also established pursuant to a valid
purpose which falls within the state's police power, and accordingly
should be upheld.
Under the second part of the Yee test, it is unlikely that chal-
lengers could successfully prove that they had uniquely suffered an
economic loss for two reasons. Most importantly, rent control provi-
sions are designed to allow a reasonable rate of return, thus, no loss
should be incurred.3" Second, since rent control provisions apply
343. In addition to providing affordable housing, the proposed MIHO intends to "[slet
standards for the availability of affordable ownership and rental housing opportunities in all
new residential developments, while at the same time providing a combination of regulatory
reforms and incentives that offset increased costs of complying with the standards." Proposed
MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.5(c)(3).
344. Casella v. City of Morgan Hill, 280 Cal. Rptr. 876, 884-85 (Ct. App. 1991), rev.
denied, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3294 (1991), dismissed, 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14,904 (N.D.
Cal. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1665 (1992).
345. Id. at 884.
346. Id. at 884-85.
347. See id.; see also Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Decv. Comm'n, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Ct. App. 1970):
It is a well settled rule that determination of the necessity and form of
regulations enacted pursuant to the police power is primarily a legislative and not
a judicial function, and is to be tested in the courts not by what the judges indi-
vidually or collectively may think of the wisdom or necessity of a particular regu-
lation, but solely by the answer to the question is there any reasonable basis in
fact to support the legislative determination of the regulation's wisdom and necessi-
ty?
Id. at 905 (citations omitted).
348. So long as a party subject to price controls is allowed a reasonable rate of return,
the control will not be deemed confiscatory. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natu-
ral Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944) (holding that rates established by the Commission for
natural gas were just and reasonable); Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,
315 U.S. 575, 581-82 (1942) (same).
19951
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
uniformly to all property owners subject to inclusionary housing, no
particular landowners are singled out to bear a greater burden. So
long as rent control restrictions apply uniformly to all new rental
properties in areas subject to inclusionary housing and allow a prop-
erty owner to earn a reasonable investment return, this challenge
would fail.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Challenges
Developers, market rate home owners in developments subject to
inclusionary housing, and inclusionary unit owners may challenge
various aspects of inclusionary housing programs on due process and
equal protection grounds. The challenges would be based on the un-
reasonableness or arbitrariness of inclusionary housing, or the dispa-
rate impact of inclusionary housing on select groups. The Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides in part that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." 9 Similarly, the California Constitu-
tion provides that "[a] person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law or denied equal protection 'of the
laws."
350
A Fourteenth Amendment claim thus challenges the rationality or
fairness of the regulatory process. Impacted parties could contest
either the facial validity of a regulation as generally unconstitutional,
or a regulation's constitutionality as applied to a particular parcel of
land.35' The proper remedy under facial claims would be to strike
down the challenged regulation. 52 As-applied violations would war-
rant injunctive relief and possibly damages for any unconstitutional
application.353 While the tests for the two types of claims are some-
what different under the due process and equal protection clauses,
they are frequently applied interchangeably so the analysis of the two
clauses cannot always be clearly broken down into one or the other.
349. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
350. CAL. CONST. art. I, §7(a).
351. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1988); Eide v. Sarasota Coun-
ty, 908 F.2d 716, 725-26 (11th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing an as-applied challenge from a
facial one by noting that the former only becomes ripe for adjudication when a "deci-
sion . . . [has been] finally made and applied to the property," but the latter is ripe after
passage of the regulation), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1120 (1991).
352. Eide, 908 F.2d at 722.
353. Id
[V/ol. 23:539
INCLUSIONARY HOUSING
Thus, while I treat them separately, there is conceptual overlap of the
clauses.
1. Due Process
a. Procedural Due Process
Various components of the Proposed MIHO may violate either
procedural or substantive due process. Procedural due process requires
that a party receive notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to
being deprived of a significant interest involving life, liberty, or prop-
erty.
354
In a land use context, to the extent that governmental actions
generally affect all property owners equally, the government need not
give property owners actual notice and an opportunity to be
heard.3"' However, if a relatively small number of people are affect-
ed by a regulation, the failure to provide those individuals with notice
and an opportunity to be heard constitutes a denial of procedural due
process. 6 Procedural due process thus attempts to mitigate govern-
ment actions with potentially harmful effects on an impacted group's
use of property by requiring that the impacted group be given ade-
quate notice and an opportunity to be heard before being legally
bound by such action. In order to state a claim under procedural due
process, impacted parties must establish that: the government action
was the type to which due process applies; they had a protected
property interest; and that the protected interest was diminished or
removed without the process due under the circumstances. 57
It is unlikely that the Proposed MIHO would be challenged on
procedural due process grounds because as a state law,35 it will ap-
354. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550, 552 (1965) (citations omitted).
355. See, e.g., Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890, 896
(6th Cir. 1991); Harris v. County of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1990).
356. Harris, 904 F.2d at 501-02.
357. Id. at 501; see also Nasierowski Bros., 949 F.2d at 897 (citing Trever v. City of
Sterling Heights, 218 NAV.2d 810, 812 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974)) (stating that a landowner may
also establish a protected property right by undertaking substantial action in reliance on zon-
ing in existence at the time the actions were undertaken, such that a zoning change would
substantially and detrimentally impact the property owner); Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300,
1305 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that in order to establish a property right subject to due pro-
cess protection, a landowner's existing property interest must arise through an independent
source such as a federal or state law).
358. The California legislature can only make law by statute, which must be enacted by
a bill. A bill may only be passed if it is read by title on three days in each house (subject
to exception if two-thirds of the membership concur in a rollcall vote). Furthermore, no bill
may be passed until the bill, with any amendments, has been distributed in print to each
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ply equally to similarly situated property owners or developers. For
the same reason, local inclusionary housing programs that apply
equally to similarly situated property owners or developers, would
also survive a procedural due process challenge. Furthermore, local
ordinances, at least in California, would be subject to an intense
notice and hearing process pursuant to state law requirements.3 9
California state law and.local ordinance enactment procedures would
satisfy procedural due process requirements. Thus, it is unlikely that a
claim would arise, much less succeed, on procedural due process
grounds.
b. Substantive Due Process
Government action that infringes upon rights traditionally associ-
ated with property ownership, such as use and development, violates
substantive due process when the action is "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safe-
ty, morals, or general welfare."3" In Euclid, the Court cautioned
that in deciding issues arising under the due process clause, courts
should take a case by case approach in applying and extending con-
stitutional principles, rather than establishing general rules to which
future cases must be fitted. 6' Thus, while there are some general
guidelines for handling a due process challenge, there is no bright-line
rule for determining whether regulations violate substantive due pro-
cess rights.
member, and until a majority of the membership of each house concurs by a rollcall vote.
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(b).
359. See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 50020-50022.10 (West 1994). These sections
provide generally that public hearings must be held prior to adoption of an ordinance, and
that notice of such hearings must be published in advance. The notice must include the time
and place of the hearing, as well as a description of the purpose of the ordinance and its
subject matter. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50022.3 (West 1994).
360. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (citations omit-
ted); see Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n v. City of Sini Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1407 (9th Cir.
1989); Nash v. City of Santa Monica, 688 P.2d 894, 899 (Cal. 1984); see also Bateson v.
Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988). In Bateson, the court held that a city council's deci-
sion to withhold a building permit, even though the applicant had fully complied with all
conditions to the issuance of the permit, violated the applicant's due process rights. See id. at
1303. Because this was a substantive due process claim, the applicant did not have to prove
that he had been deprived of all economically viable use of his property. The test instead
was whether the city council's interference with the applicant's property rights was irrational
or arbitrary and capricious. Id. Thus, unreasonableness of governmental action is an adequate
basis to strike down the action.
361. Ambler Really, 272 U.S. at 397.
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Impacted developers could challenge the Proposed MIHO as
being arbitrary or unreasonable because it requires residential develop-
ers to provide housing affordable to low- and moderate-income fami-
lies as a condition to development approval.362 The Proposed MIHO
thus charges a premium of sorts to new housing developers, freeing
former developers and government, among others, from an obligation
to provide affordable housing. Impacted developers would argue that
this is especially unfair because they are not solely, or even primarily,
responsible for the affordable housing crisis. In Associated Home
Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek,363 the plaintiffs made a simi-
lar argument, contending that the challenged ordinance arbitrarily
applied only to subdividers, and not to apartment developers."'
While the court acknowledged the merit of plaintiffs' argument, it did
not invalidate the ordinance on due process grounds because there
were adequate distinctions to justify disparate legislative treatment of
the two types of developers.365 Government entities which enact
inclusionary housing programs could likewise successfully argue that
there are sufficient reasons for treating impacted developers different-
ly. For example, the Proposed MIHO only applies to developers of a
minimum number of units.3" Part of the rationale behind this mini-
mum number is that it promotes the production of inclusionary units
while still allowing profitability.367
Developers could also argue that the Proposed MIHO is arbitrary
because it selects a random number of inclusionary units to be pro-
362. See Proposed MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.7(a)(2)(A).
363. 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971).
364. See id. at 614. This case involved a state statute which allowed a city or county to
require land dedication or payment of an in-lieu fee for park and recreational purposes, as a
condition to subdivision map approval. See id at 608. The City of Walnut Creek enacted
legislation which implemented the state statute. Id It provided in part that:
two and one-half acres of park . . . must be provided [by a subdivider] for each
1,000 new residents. If, however, no park is designated on the master plan and the
subdivision is within three-fourths of a mile radius of a park or a proposed park,
or the dedication of land is not feasible, the subdivider must pay a fee equal to
the value of the land which he would have been required to dedicate under the
formula.
Id. at 609. Plaintiffs challenged each of the state and city statutes. Id. at 608.
365. See id. at 614. The court noted that "It]he Legislature could reasonably have as-
sumed that an apartment house is . . . ordinarily constructed upon land considerably smaller
in dimension than most subdivisions . i . . This significant distinction justifies legislatively
treating the builder of an apartment house who does not subdivide differently than the creator
of a subdivision." Id.
366. See Proposed MIIO, supra note 14, § 65853.7(a)(1).
367. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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duced 6s This argument would fail because the Proposed MIHO re-
quires that a feasibility study be performed which determines both the
income levels served by the ordinance, and a fair percentage of re-
quired inclusionary units, taking into account the need for both profit-
ability and affordable housing. 369 Because the percentage of required
inclusionary units is calculated by determining a maximum number of
units that can profitably be built without public subsidies,37 the
MIHIO formula for determining the number of units is clearly not
arbitrary or irrational. And again, judicial deference to legislative
action would weaken a challenger's position.37'
Apartment owners and inclusionary unit owners subject to rent
control restrictions, could challenge those restrictions on the ground
that they violate substantive due process. In addressing substantive
due process claims in a rent control context, the Court in Pennell v.
City of San Jose372 stated that "[t]he standard for determining
whether a state price-control regulation is constitutional under the Due
Process Clause is well established: 'Price control is "unconstitution-
al ... if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the
policy the legislature is free to adopt.""' 373 The Court also acknowl-
edged a government's general right to interfere in a marketplace via
price control mechanisms, to alleviate a "discrepancy between supply
and demand in the market for a certain product.
374
Applying the Pennell standard to the Proposed MIHO, the first
question is whether the rent control restrictions are arbitrary or "de-
monstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to
adopt. '375 This hurdle would be practically insurmountable to a chal-
lenging party. First, it would be difficult to prove that rent control
provisions are arbitrary because they are designed to preserve
368. See Proposed MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.7(a)(2)(A)-(B).
369. See id.
370. See id.
371. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
372. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
373. Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
374. Id. at 12. In Pennell, there was a discrepancy between the existing housing supply
and the great demand for housing, especially low-income housing. See id. The parties to this
action acknowledged the validity of the ordinance's purpose, which was "alleviatling] somle of
the more immediate needs created by San Jose's housing situation" by preventing "excessive
and unreasonable rent increases" caused by the "growing shortage of and increasing demand
for housing in the City of San Jose." Id. at 4, 12 (quoting SAN JOSE, CAL., MUN. ORDI-
NANCE § 5701.2 (1979) (amended by ch. 17.23.020) (alteration in original).
375. Id. at 11.
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inclusionary units, with actual rental rates based on studies which
balance the goals of preserving affordability with maintaining reason-
able profits. Second, rent control provisions are clearly relevant to the
policy of providing and retaining affordable housing. Housing policy,
therefore, is clearly included within those policies which legislatures
are free to adopt. Thus, a court would not find the Proposed MIHO's
rent restrictions to be arbitrary or unreasonable, nor would the restric-
tions violate substantive due process.
The potential challenges under the "reasonable and arbitrary"
portion of the substantive due process clause are all relatively weak.
They would be insufficient to strike down the above-discussed provi-
sions in the Proposed MIHO, considering its findings and well-rea-
soned policy statement,376 and the valid purposes behind the provi-
sions.
Another way to attack the Proposed IHO on substantive due
process grounds is to establish that it is beyond the police power, or
that there is no nexus between it and the police power.377 The pro-
vision of affordable housing is clearly within the police power be-
cause it protects the health, safety, and welfare of citizens by provid-
ing them with shelter opportunities."' However, that does not mean
that any method is permissible to reach such end. Nonetheless, be-
cause the principal purpose of the Proposed MIHO and of
inclusionary housing generally, is to provide housing affordable to
very low-, low-, and moderate-income families, and the provision of
housing is within the scope of the police power, there is a clear and
direct nexus between inclusionary housing and the police power.
Finally, in determining the relationship between an ordinance and the
police power, courts generally defer to the legislature. 79 According-
ly, a challenge under this part of the substantive due process clause
also would fail.
376. See Proposed MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.5.
377. See Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606, 610-13
(Cal. 1971); Fox & Davis, supra note 20, at 1029.
378. See Fox & Davis, supra note 20, at 1029-30.
If local governments may require slum rehabilitation, preservation of historical sites
and natural areas, clustering of structures to maintain open space, mixture of land
uses within zones, exactions of land as a condition of permit approval, and grant-
ing of tax preferences to preserve agricultural lands, then construction of low and
moderate cost housing logically falls within the permissible exercise of the police
power.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
379. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
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There is no evidence that the Proposed MIHO is either arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable. To the contrary, it has been carefully
designed to require production of a specific number of inclusionary
units, with the actual number based on a feasibility analysis. 3" The
final blow to a substantive due process challenge is that courts gener-
ally give judicial deference to legislative action.381 Accordingly, un-
less an inclusionary housing program were drafted without findings,
or without a policy statement describing the problems which it aimed
to address, or without a rational legislative purpose, it would be up-
held.
2. Equal Protection
Courts use two general standards in reviewing challenges under
the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment: "strict scrutiny"
and "rational basis." The "strict scrutiny" standard is utilized in re-
viewing regulations that affect certain recognized suspect categories
(i.e., race) and fundamental interests382 (i.e., right of free speech).
Under a strict scrutiny standard, the government must demonstrate
both that a challenged regulation has been narrowly drawn and that it
furthers a compelling interest."' A challenging party under this stan-
dard has a reasonable chance of victory because of the government's
heavy burden. Under the rationality standard, a challenged regulation
will be upheld if there is any rational basis for a regulation which
affects "non-suspect" classes more than the general population."
While some housing advocates have argued that the right to housing
is a fundamental interest,385 that argument has failed.386 Economic
regulations and land use regulations thus continue to be measured
against the rationality standard. 317 The use of this standard has been
380. See, e.g., Proposed MIHO, supra note 14, § 65853.7(a)(2)(A)-(B).
381. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
382. See, e.g., City bf Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cir., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1984); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 US. 1, 61 (1973).
383. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Griffin Dev. Co. v. City of Oxnard, 703 P.2d 339, 343
(Cal. 1985) (holding that "where a zoning law or other land use regulation infringes upon a
constitutionally protected personal liberty or fundamental right, 'it must be narrowly drawn
and must further a sufficiently substantial government interest' (citations omitted)).
384. New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Eide v. Sarasota County, 908
F.2d 716, 722 (11th Cir. 1990); Fry v. City of Hayward, 701 F. Supp. 179, 181 (N.D. Cal.
1988).
385. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
387. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981);
Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 485 (Cal. 1976);
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justified because:
Most zoning and land use ordinances affect population growth
and density .... As commentators have observed, to insist that such
zoning laws are invalid unless the interests supporting the exclusion
are compelling in character, and cannot be achieved by an alterna-
tive method, would result in wholesale invalidation of land use
controls and endanger the validity of city and regional planning.388
Parties attacking inclusionary housing on equal protection
grounds must prove that the ordinance is discriminatory and not ratio-
nally related to a legitimate state interest. This is a heavy burden
which is rarely met because of the general rule that "legislation is
presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn
by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
389
a. Developers
In the land use context, courts might find a classification to be
discriminatory if similarly situated parcels are treated differently. 390
Developers could challenge inclusionary housing under the equal
protection clause because it requires some, but not all, developers to
build affordable housing. Inclusionary housing therefore singles out
certain developers to bear the cost of a community-wide problem. For
example, under the Proposed MIHO, only developers of new residen-
tial developments consisting of a minimum of ten units are required
to build inclusionary units.39' This argument would probably fail be-
cause all developers of projects containing the minimum unit require-
ments are required to produce inclusionary units. While commercial
developers or developers of projects containing fewer than the requi-
site number of units may not be subject to inclusionary housing re-
quirements, they are not situated similarly (because of the difference
in project types or size). The distinctive treatment is thus justified be-
cause similarly situated developers are in fact treated similarly.
Remmenga v. California Coastal Comm'n, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628, 630 (Ct. App. 1985); Fox &
Davis, supra note 20, at 1033.
388. Associated Home Builders, 557 P.2d at 485 (citations omitted).
389. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (noting that "when social or economic legislation is at
issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude . . . and the Constitution
presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic pro-
cesses" (citations omitted)).
390. Southern Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197, 203-04 (Ct. App. 1966).
391. See supra text in first full paragraph following note 105. This section of the Pro-
posed MIHO also specifies exceptions to the construction requirement.
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Developers could also argue that inclusionary requirements dis-
criminate against them because such requirements are tied to the need
for affordable housing generally, and are not related specifically to
developers' use of their land. This type of argument would be akin to
the argument that exactions or dedications, which are not specifically
tied to a development, violate equal protection. However, in discuss-
ing the validity of these types of conditions to development, a Cali-
fornia court affirmed that:
[A] subdivider who was seeking to acquire the advantages of subdi-
vision had the duty to comply with reasonable conditions for dedica-
tion so as to conform to the welfare of the lot owners and the
general public. We held, further, that the conditions were not im-
proper because their fulfillment would incidentally benefit the city
as a whole or because future as well as immediate needs were taken
into consideration and that potential as well as present population
factors affecting the neighborhood could be considered in formulat-
ing the conditions imposed upon the subdivider.3"
Accordingly, if development is conditioned on the construction of
inclusionary units, such condition would be upheld so long as it was
related to the project (even if it incidentally benefitted the overall
geographic area's housing need, or took into consideration future
needs). There is a compelling argument that in determining whether
to approve a new project, a local government must take into consider-
ation housing for all income categories. Thus, if there is a need for
low-income housing, it is a reasonable condition to development that
low-income housing be built (in the same way that development may
be conditioned on the construction of schools, parks, and other im-
provements that may be needed).393
392. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606, 610 (Cal.
1971).
393. Housing commentators analyzing a below market price ("bmp") unit program, argued
that the program would withstand an equal protection attack for the following reasons:
If state law permits exactions for purposes of a general public need to which the
development would contribute, a [below market price] requirement would not seem
to deny equal protection. Local legislatures may determine that traditional residen-
tial projects tend to develop land, increase housing prices, create environmental
problems, and fail to meet the need for low and moderate cost housing, all with
the past implicit approval of the zoning authority. . . . [Certain types of] develop-
ments tend to accelerate these social problems, and local solutions, therefore, logi-
cally should begin with the largest contributors to the shortage of low cost hous-
ing.
Fox & Davis, supra note 20, at 1033. Under this rationale, inclusionary requirements could
[Vol. 23:539
INCLUSIONARY HOUSING
b. Inclusionary Unit Owners
Inclusionary unit owners could argue that resale restrictions sin-
gle them out by limiting both their market of buyers and their sales
price.
The rationality standard would apply and so long as the restric-
tions were rationally related to a legitimate state interest and were not
unconstitutionally discriminatory, they would be upheld. As will be
established in the section on restraints on alienation, resale restrictions
are rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of pre-
serving the stock of affordable housing.3" It is unlikely that resale
restrictions would be deemed unconstitutionally discriminatory for
several reasons. First, they apply to all inclusionary unit owners.39
Thus, no inclusionary unit owners are singled out for unfair treatment.
Second, most resale restrictions allow an inclusionary unit owner to
recover costs incurred in the purchase and upkeep of a unit, as well
as to earn a reasonable rate of return on the unit.396 Third, the re-
strictions at issue are the same type of restrictions which allowed an
inclusionary unit owner to initially purchase a unit. Equity therefore
dictates that it is fair and not discriminatory to uphold those restric-
tions with respect to subsequent sales of inclusionary units.
c. Market Rate Occupants
Market rate unit owners can argue that inclusionary housing
violates both substantive due process and equal protection clauses
because it causes them to pay a premium for their units to the extent
developers pass part of the cost of providing inclusionary units for-
ward.
397
As a starting point, it is far from certain that developers will
pass costs on to market rate owners.398 Accordingly, this argument
be justified for developments which are more likely to contribute to the shortage of low cost
housing, i.e., larger developments or developments which use scarce land in a high land cost
area.
394. See infra part V.C.l.
395. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 118.
396. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 88.
397. "Most economists, builders and social planners agree . . . that any regulatory system
that drives up builder costs in a housing market area will certainly result in an increase in
housing prices for market home buyers in that area." Hill, supra note 183, at 14.
398. The incentives in most programs are designed to offset costs of providing
inclusionary units. Theoretically, any costs incurred could be recouped through incentives such
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is valid only if these home owners in fact pay a premium for their
units. Even if some costs are passed on to market rate unit owners,
the proportional cost of a market rate home attributable to
inclusionary housing is uncertain.3 Assuming some costs were
passed on to market rate unit owners, a California court rejected a
similar challenge that dedications or fees in-lieu thereof placed special
burdens on future inhabitants of subdivisions.' The Associated
Home Builders court stated that if it recognized the burdens placed on
new inhabitants, it had to recognize the burden on existing and for-
mer inhabitants of paying for the purchase and maintenance of exist-
ing public facilities."° t So, even if challengers could prove that they
were unfairly impacted because they paid a premium for their units,
they would not succeed under an equal protection claim because
courts have recognized that some costs must be absorbed by residents
of a new project." Accordingly, an equal protection challenge by
market rate unit owners would be rejected.
In sum, the inherent fairness and reasonableness of most
inclusionary housing programs, and of the Proposed MIHO as evi-
denced by requisite feasibility studies, virtually ensure that the pro-
grams will be upheld. Studies indicate that programs are not adopted
arbitrarily, and they demonstrate that careful thought goes into pro-
grams prior to their adoption.' 3 Most programs also contain find-
ings which explain a program's purposes, which purposes are general-
ly tied to the legitimate state interest of providing affordable hous-
ing.4" For these reasons, it is unlikely that either the Proposed
MIHO or most inclusionary housing programs, would violate the
as density bonuses and there would not be any costs to pass on to market rate owners. See
supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
399. One source notes:
Because of the many expenses incurred by a developer, the cause of any increase
in price can only be speculated upon. For example, dedication of land for roads,
parks, schools, and other public facilities necessarily increases the developer's ex-
penses, which are in turn passed on to the housing purchasers. Additional expenses
for constructing [below market price] units fall within the same category of facili-
ties provided for public objectives and benefiting the developer's land.
Fox & Davis, supra note 20, at 1034.
400. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606, 618 (Cal.
1971).
401. Id. at 613-14.
402. Id. at 614-16.
403. See, e.g., NIMBY REPORT, supra note 21.
404. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55 (West 1989); Monterey, Cal., Resolution 82-16 (Jan.
19, 1982); MONTGOMERY, MD., CODE ch. 25A-1 (1988).
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Fourteenth Amendment Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.
C. Restraints on Alienation
This section explores whether restrictions on the sale of
inclusionary units violate laws prohibiting restraints on alienation and
contracts in restraint of trade or commerce, including price-fixing
agreements. While the law generally disfavors these restraints, if they
are reasonable under the circumstances, they are typically upheld. 5
Most restraints on alienation within inclusionary housing programs are
reasonable and tend to be narrowly drawn in order to preserve alien-
ability while retaining the stock of affordable housing.' Therefore,
they would likely survive a challenge under this claim.
1. Resale Controls
Resale controls, deed restrictions, and other restrictions on the
transfer of inclusionary units, may be invalid as unreasonable re-
straints on use or alienation.'
The traditional rule against restraints on alienation is based on
the public policy notion that the free alienability of property fosters
economic and commercial development. However, almost from the
inception of the rule, competing policy considerations have led to
exceptions to the rule, with the validity of the restraint determined
on the basis of the duration, type of alienation precluded or the size
of the class precluded from taking. The modem view is to test the
validity of the restraints by weighing the competing social poli-
cies'
Before elaborating on the above balancing test, some restraints
are not subject to the test and are thus generally upheld. There is a
recognized exception to the rule against restraints on alienation under
a preemptive right. In addition, the statutory requirement doctrine
removes certain restraints from the application of the rule.
A preemptive right is an option to purchase, such as the first
405. See, e.g., City of Oceanside v. McKenna, 264 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279 n.4 (Ct. App.
1989); Housing Auth. v. Monterey Senior Citizen Park, 210 Cal. Rptr. 497, 501 (Ct. App.
1985).
406. See, e.g., City of Oceanside, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 279 n.4.
407. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1994) ("Conditions restraining alienation, when repug-
nant to the interest created, are void."); RESTATEtMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY 142 (1983)
("The rule against direct restraints on alienation is older than the rule against perpetuities:').
408. City of Oceanside, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 279 n.4 (citations omitted).
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rights to purchase commonly contained in resale restrictions. Options
of this sort are generally upheld if "the terms of the right of first
refusal are reasonable in regard to both the price that the designated
person must pay, and the time allowed for the exercise of the right of
first refusal."'  Many inclusionary housing program purchase op-
tions designate a price based on factors which preserve affordability,
while allowing a reasonable rate of return on an investment. These
pricing formulas are carefully designed to allow an inclusionary unit
owner to recover actual costs plus appreciation."' 0 Thus, they are
reasonable and equitable with respect to the price. The time period
within which an option holder must exercise an option varies, with
sixty days about average.4" If an option is not exercised within that
time period, it lapses (for purposes of that sale but will usually sur-
vive for a set number of years from the commencement of the
inclusionary housing program). The time period is thus calculated to
give an option holder a fair period of time to purchase a unit, while
not unduly restricting an owner's right to sell the unit. The time
allowed for exercise of an option is also, therefore, quite reasonable.
Under the preemptive right exception, options as a resale control
would thus be upheld.
The statutory requirement doctrine does not so much carve out
an exception for restraints established pursuant to statute, but rather
allows certain restrictions, even if they inhibit marketability. The
rationale is that the common law rule against restraints on alienation
applies to restraints in contracts, not to restraints established by stat-
ute or operation of law.412 Thus, if California were to enact the Pro-
409. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 4.4(b) (1983) (an illustration of acceptable
restraints are "[preemptive provisions [which] are widely used in residential develop-
ments . . . to provide some control over the selection of persons who become neighbors in
the residential area"); see also Housing Auth. v. Monterey Senior Citizen Park, 210 Cal.
Rptr. 497, 501 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Option to Purchase Agreement" did not violate the restraint
on alienation provisions when "the consideration for this option is the execution" of the
lease.); 4 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 410 (9th ed. 1987) ("A condition
that a grantee will not sell the estate without first offering it to the grantor or some other
designated person is valid. This type of promissory restraint does not unreasonably inhibit
alienation.') (citations omitted).
410. See, e.g., Monterey, Cal., Resolution 90-12 (Jan. 16, 1990). The Monterey program
provides that the purchase price shall be the lower of the market value or moderate income
price. It defines moderate income price as the "[slum of original sale price, annual consumer
price index adjustments, and value of improvements authorized by the City, less costs to
repair deficiencies identified through structural pest control/city inspection." Id.
411. Id.
412. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Part II Vol. IV (1944); 4 B.E. WITKIN, supra note
[Vol. 23:539
INCLUSIONARY HOUSING
posed MIHO, any resale restrictions in the program would not be
subject to the rule because the restraints would be established by
statute.
With respect to resale restrictions in other inclusionary housing
programs, since they may be enacted pursuant to California's housing
element legislation,413 there is a strong argument that they should be
upheld under the statutory requirement rationale. Buttressing this
argument, the HCD's legal counsel reviewed deed restrictions in an
earlier version of Orange County's inclusionary housing ordinance to
determine whether they violated the policy against restraints on alien-
ation. HCD opined that the restrictions fell within the statutory re-
quirement exception because they were imposed by statute or rule of
law.4 14 While the HCD does not have the authority of a legislature
or court, its opinion would likely influence a court. In addition, in
California, one could argue that resale restrictions in inclusionary
housing programs could be upheld under the statutory requirement
rationale because the restraints are established by operation of law in
order to comply with the housing element mandate.4"5
If one of the above exceptions did not apply to uphold resale
restrictions, a court would then perform a balancing test. It would
weigh the policy favoring free alienability against the social policy
furthered by the restrictions, taking into consideration the reasonable-
ness and duration of the restrictions (the longer the duration, the
stronger the social policy justification must be to uphold it), the alien-
ation precluded, and the quantum of restraint (the greater the restraint,
the stronger the social policy justification must be to uphold it).416
409, § 405.
413. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
414. Bozung, A Positive Response, supra note 143, at 840-42. The statutory requirement
rationale applied because the resale restrictions, as part of the inclusionary housing program,
were effectuated through a local legislative act in compliance with the state required housing
element law. The preemptive right exception also applied because the Orange County program
granted the County an option to purchase, which the County could exercise by either pur-
chasing an inclusionary unit outright, or by offering it to an eligible purchaser. The HCD
opinion stressed that in addition to the foregoing reasons for upholding the resale restrictions,
the restrictions were reasonable because (a) they were enacted to increase the stock of afford-
able housing, and (b) an owner was allowed to recoup, at a minimum, any initial investment
plus some costs and appreciation as measured by specified guidelines. Id. Furthermore, there
would generally be a large market of qualified purchasers and if the unit did not sell within
a stated period under the resale restrictions, it could be sold on the open market for fair
market value. Id.
415. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
416. See Laguna Royale Owners Ass'n v. Darger, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136, 144 (Ct. Ap.
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Under the Proposed MIHO and most inclusionary housing pro-
grams, the social policy furthered by resale restrictions is the provi-
sion and retention of housing affordable to low- and moderate-income
households. Courts have held that this is a justifiable social policy
within the ambit of the state police power."7 A California court
which addressed the validity of resale restrictions in dicta, stated that
the restrictions were valid because not all restraints on alienation are
void, only those that are unreasonable.4"8 The restrictions in that
case were reasonable because they were directly related to the provi-
sion of affordable housing, which in turn supported, rather than of-
fended, recognized state policies.4"9 This strengthens the validity of
resale restrictions in inclusionary housing programs because they also
are designed to preserve the stock of affordable housing.
In determining reasonableness, a court would also factor in the
duration of resale controls. As drafted, the Proposed MIHO's resale
restrictions limit the restrictions' duration to a five year period fol-
lowing the initial purchase. Even during that period, they allow a
seller a fair investment return, pursuant to detailed provisions.42
Most resale controls also set forth a time period within which an
inclusionary unit owner may sell a unit only to a particular class of
buyers, at a given price.4 1 Normally if a qualified buyer is not lo-
cated within the prescribed time period, an owner can sell to anyone,
but at the fixed price.4" The new owner would then be subject to
the same resale restrictions, thereby preserving an affordable unit. The
restrictions are therefore reasonably related to the public policy goal
of preserving affordable housing.
1981) ( The day has long since passed when the rule in California was that all restraints on
alienation were unlawful under the statute; it is now the settled law in this jurisdiction that
only unreasonable restraints on alienation are invalid.").
417. See City of Oceanside v. McKenna, 264 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279-80 (Ct. App. 1989).
418. Martin v. Villa Roma, Inc., 182 Cal. Rptr. 382, 383 (Ct. App. 1982). The defendant
in this case was a housing cooperative which provided "moderate, low-cost" housing. Id. at
382. An issue before the court was whether the defendant corporation's bylaws restricting
both the class of buyers and the sales price of a membership in the corporation were invalid
as an unreasonable restraint on alienation. Id. at 383.
419. Id. at 383-84.
420. While the price is not fixed per se, a resale price formula is set forth in
California's proposed amendment, thereby limiting the initial sales price and subsequent resale
prices. See Proposed MIHO, supra note 14.
421. See, e.g., supra notes 86-91.
422. Note, however, that this rarely occurs because of the high demand for affordable
housing. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81, which discusses the lottery process that is
typically necessary to choose beneficiaries of inclusionary housing programs.
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A court would also look at the alienation precluded and the
quantum of restraint. In an inclusionary housing context, both the
sales price and class of purchasers are generally restricted. However,
inclusionary unit owners are not prohibited from selling their units. In
fact, they can generally sell their units at any time, albeit to a re-
stricted class of buyers and at a fixed price. However, as noted previ-
ously, most programs limit the period during which an owner must
sell to a restricted class member. If the owner cannot find a buyer
during that time period, either a specified agency will purchase the
unit or the owner can sell it to any willing buyer, at the fixed price.
Some programs even allow an inclusionary unit to be sold at market
price."
A court would probably uphold the Proposed MIHO resale re-
strictions, which are typical of resale restrictions found in many
inclusionary housing programs, for many reasons. First, the recognized
preemptive right exception would apply to options or first rights to
purchase. Second, the statutory requirement rule would apply to the
Proposed MIHO and to local inclusionary housing programs, because
they are representative of the state policy encouraging the production
of affordable housing. Third, most restrictions would be deemed rea-
sonable considering the purpose and effect of resale controls. Fourth,
resale controls, even those in effect in perpetuity, have been upheld to
date. Fifth, state policy favors the production of affordable housing,
as manifested through both judicial decisions and legislation.4 4
2. Antitrust Law
The Sherman Act (the "Act") prohibits every contract in restraint
of trade or commerce, including price-fixing agreements.4" Resale
restrictions could therefore be challenged as violating federal antitrust
laws. The Act represents very broad legislation, intended to deal
comprehensively with free trade.4" Courts have thus been left to
shape the Act.427 Early in the history of antitrust law, the Supreme
423. In this case, an equity or subsidy recapture should kick in to prevent a windfall to
the seller and to preserve money for affordable housing programs generally. For a discussion
of recapture programs, see supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
424. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65583(a)-(c), 65589.5, 65915 (West 1994); City of
Oceanside v. McKenna, 264 Cal. Rptr. 275 (Ct. App. 1989); Winkleman v. City of Tiburon,
108 Cal. Rptr. 415 (Ct. App. 1973).
425. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-11 (1988).
426. Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911).
427. Id. at 63-64.
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Court established the rule of reason, which applies generally to anti-
trust cases.4" The premise of the rule of reason is that the Act can
be interpreted neither literally nor in a vacuum. The court stated:
The merely generic enumeration which the statute makes of the acts
to which it refers and the absence of any definition of restraint of
trade as used in the statute leaves room for but one conclusion,
which is, that it was expressly designed not to unduly limit the
application of the act by precise definition, but while clearly fixing
a standard, that is, by defining the ulterior boundaries which could
not be transgressed with impunity, to leave it to be determined by
the light of reason, guided by the principles of law and the duty to
apply and enforce the public policy embodied in the statute, in
every given case whether any particular act or contract was within
the contemplation of the statute.429
Consequently, we have another issue which cannot be resolved
through a bright-line test separating legal from illegal acts. Instead, a
court must make a case by case determination as to whether a con-
tract is in restraint of trade. While the rule of reason is generally
utilized in antitrust cases, the Court has established that certain types
of activities are so clearly in violation of the Act, that if proof of
those activities is presented, a court does not have to resort to the
rule of reason. "Among the practices which the courts have heretofore
deemed to be unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing...
division of markets . . . group boycotts . . . and tying arrange-
ments.
430
In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,43 the Court dealt
specifically with price-fixing and held that "[u]nder the Sherman Act
a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.' 4 32 The Socony case
focused on combinations as perpetrators of price-fixing schemes be-
cause the defendants in that case comprised a combination. But, it is
not essential that the price-fixing entity be a combination; it can be a
private party or even a city or municipal agency which is responsible
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
431. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
432. Id. at 223.
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for resale administration.' While activities and practices of private
developers are clearly subject to the Act, it has not always been clear
whether governmental activities are also subject to the Act.
In Lafayette, the Court confirmed that local governmental activi-
ties are within the scope of federal antitrust laws.4" However, the
Lafayette Court reiterated that certain types of governmental activities
are exempt from antitrust laws. In discussing what types of activities
are within the purview of antitrust laws and which are not, the Court
stated that "[w]e ... conclude that the Parker doctrine exempts only
anticompetitive conduct engaged in as an act of government by the
State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions, pursuant to state policy to
displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service."4
In determining whether local government action is subject to the
Act, a crucial question is whether "the state policy requiring the
anticompetitive restraint as part of a comprehensive regulatory system,
was one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state poli-
cy."436 Therefore, if the Proposed MIHO were at issue, since it
"clearly articulates and affirmatively expresses" California state poli-
cy,437 any provisions restraining trade, including price-fixing provi-
sions, would be exempt from the Act.
When analyzing a local inclusionary housing program's resale
controls, including price-fixing provisions, the link between state
policy and price-fixing agreements is more tenuous. "[In the absence
of evidence that the State authorized or directed a given municipality
to act as it did, the actions of a particular city hardly can be found to
be pursuant to 'the state['s] command,' or to be restraints that 'the
state ... as sovereign' imposed.""'3  Nonetheless, a local government
may still be able to shelter price-fixing agreements under the Parker
433. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
434. id. at 393-94. Note, however, that the Lafayette Court was divided (an understate-
ment). Justice Brennan was joined by four Justices (including the Chief Justice) in part I of
the opinion, and he was joined by three Justices in parts It and III of the opinion. Justice
Marshall filed a concurring opinion and Chief Justice Burger filed an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion joined by two
Justices for the entire dissent and by a third Justice for all but part I-B of the dissent. And
finally, Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion.
435. Id. at 413. The Parker doctrine provides that in determining whether the action of a
municipality is exempt from antitrust laws, the critical factor is "whether the challenged ac-
tion was 'an act of government' by the State as 'sovereign."' Id. at 409.
436. Id. at 410.
437. The state policy of providing housing for all segments of the population has been
established earlier in this Article. See, e.g., supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
438. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 414 (citations omitted).
19951
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
doctrine, even without an express state directive. The Lafayette Court
stated:
While a subordinate governmental unit's claim to Parker immunity
is not as readily established as the same claim by a state govern-
ment sued as such, we agree ... that an adequate state mandate for
anticompetitive activities of cities and other subordinate governmen-
tal units exists when it is found "from the authority given a govern-
mental entity to operate in a particular area, that the legislature
contemplated the kind of action complained of."'439
A locality could argue that resale controls are instituted for the pur-
pose of providing and retaining affordable housing, which furthers the
state's public policies of assisting "in the development of adequate
housing to meet the needs of low- and moderate-income house-
holds . . . ,"'4 and conserving and improving "the condition of the
existing affordable housing stock. .. ""' Furthermore, the legisla-
ture has stated that "[t]he provision of housing affordable to low- and
moderate-income households requires the cooperation of all levels of
government."'  Thus, in reading various state statutes together, they
mandate that all state and local government agencies cooperate in
effectuating the state policies of providing housing for all segments of
the population, and developing, conserving, and improving the stock
of housing for low- and moderate-income families. So long as the
state, and its agencies by extension, are engaged in activities which
further state policy, even if such policies include price-fixing agree-
ments, they should be upheld under the Parker doctrine.
A tougher issue is whether price-fixing agreements between a
developer, sellers, and buyers, all of whom are private parties, could
be upheld. 3 While an inclusionary housing proponent would argue
that the private parties were merely acting pursuant to a locality's
legislation, and thus pursuant to state approved and locally mandated
laws, there is a rather large gap between a "clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed state policy" and a private contract fixing
prices. Some commentators have indicated that private price-fixing
439. Id. at 415 (citations omitted).
440. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65583(c)(2) (West 1994).
441. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65583(c)(4) (West 1994).
442. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65580(c) (West 1994) (emphasis added).
443. In fact, many resale restrictions are privately recorded by developers through cove-
nants or deed restrictions. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85. While developers perpe-
trate restrictions, they are in many cases simply complying with laws enacted by governments
requiring them to establish mechanisms for preserving affordability.
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agreements in the affordable housing context would probably not be
upheld, in spite of the policies served by such agreements.' How-
ever, I have found no antitrust challenges to price-fixing components
of inclusionary housing programs. That, coupled with the strong poli-
cy favoring the provision and retention of affordable housing, indi-
cates that resale price maintenance agreements may well be upheld, in
spite of expressed misgivings.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are many policies which support and oppose inclusionary
housing. The ultimate determination of whether it is acceptable turns
in part on particular objectives. For example, if one objective is to
provide and retain affordable housing, then inclusionary housing is
clearly acceptable. If another objective is to promote integrated hous-
ing, it is again acceptable. If an objective is to reduce land controls
and promote a free market, then it is not acceptable. This is where
compromise becomes significant. If one accepts the ideas that there
will be land controls, land is becoming scarcer, there is an affordable
housing crisis, and government cannot solve that crisis by itself, then
inclusionary housing becomes more palatable. The difficulty is in
designing a program which balances inclusionary housing's benefits
and burdens. A program must take into account the need to produce
and retain affordable housing while providing incentives which will
offset costs incurred by parties as a result of inclusionary housing. A
program's administration and public education are also important to
its success and acceptability. Even if there are some remaining prob-
lems resulting from inclusionary housing, they do not come close to
equaling the benefits which it provides-shelter for families who
might not otherwise have roofs over their heads. Thus, it is an ac-
ceptable way to ameliorate the affordable housing crisis.
While inclusionary housing programs could be challenged on a
number of legal grounds, it is unlikely that any of those challenges
444. Betsy Strauss & Daphne Stegman, Moderate-Cost Housing After Lafayette: A Pro-
posal, 11 URB. LAw. 209 (1979).
As in resale price maintenance cases, the effect of the contracts would be to de-
stroy the free market that normally operates to set prices based upon the indepen-
dent decisions of willing sellers and buyers. All purchasers would be bound by
contract to observe fixed resale prices. Even though the restriction on resale prices
is known to the purchasers, the Sherman Act still prohibits the builder from fixing
prices for future sales.
Id. at 219-20.
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would succeed. Most programs, including the Proposed MIHO, would
survive legal challenges because they are reasonably related to the
valid governmental purpose of providing affordable housing. To en-
sure their success, they should be designed to treat similarly situated
parties equally, include sufficient incentives so that developers can
earn a reasonable profit, and prevent impacted parties from suffering
a total economic loss.
In sum, inclusionary housing programs are acceptable and would
likely withstand legal challenges. Thus, they should be supported,
with the caveat that they should be designed to balance the public
and private interests in order to equitably share any of its burdens
and benefits.
